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"The art of  taxation consists in so plucking 
the goose as to obtain the largest possible 
amount offeathers with the smallest 
possible amount of  hissing". 
- Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) Abstract 
This  dissertation analyzes tax  policy,  corporations, and capital market effects.  First, 
the  Savings  Directive,  which  has  left  a  loophole  by  providing  grandfathering  for  some 
securities,  is  examined. It  can be shown that investors are  not willing to pay a premium for 
bonds that are exempt from  the withholding rate,  so it may  be concluded that the supply of 
existing loopholes is  large enough to allow tax evaders to continue evasion at no  additional 
cost. 
Second,  tax  neutrality  towards  alternative  financing  instruments  for  corporate 
investment is a ubiquitous demand in the political debate. However, the magnitude of  possible 
efficiency  costs  of a  departure  from  tax  neutrality  is  hardly  discussed.  Against  this 
background, this  dissertation discusses the theory of capital structure and provides back-of-
the-envelope calculations of  the possible efficiency cost of a tax distortion of the debt-equity 
decision. 
Third, the ex-dividend-day effect in relation to the Gennan tax ref  rom of  2000/200 I is 
discussed. The abolishment of  the imputation system allows reinvestigating the size of  the ex-
dividend-day  effect.  I  find  no  structural  break  in  the  size  of the  German  ex-dividend-day 
effect and no evidence of  an ex-dividend-day price drop that exceeds the dividend paid. 
Fourth,  an  account  of the  quantitative  development  of tax  legislation  in  post-war 
Gennany is  presented.  It can be  shown that the  legislative output did not  increase over the 
decades and is not affected by a split majority in the upper and lower houses. Finally, it turns 
out that an increasing fraction of  this legislation is passed in December. 
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xii Überblick 
Die Steuerpolitik ist eines der zentralen Forschungsgebiete im Bereich öffentlicher Finanzen. 
Diese Dissertation analysiert die Verknüpfungen zwischen Steuerpolitik, Unternehmen sowie 
deren  Auswirkung  auf  den  Kapitalmarkt.  Steuern  beeinflussen  das  Verhalten  von 
Unternehmen und Privatpersonen.  Änderungen in  der Steuergesetzgebung können  daher zu 
Ausweichreaktionen  der  Bürger  bzw.  der  Unternehmen  fuhren.  Eine  Folge  dieser 
Ausweichreaktionen  kann  beispielsweise  sein,  dass  eine  Steuererhöhung  zu 
Steuermindereinnahmen  fuhrt.  Für  den  Staat  ist  es  daher  elementar  zu  wissen  wie 
Unternehmen  und  Privatpersonen  auf  Änderungen  der  Steuerpolitik  reagieren.  Da 
Finanzierungsentscheidungen  von  Unternehmen,  und  somit  die  Auswahl  der  Anlagen, 
ebenfalls  durch  Steuern  beeinflusst  werden,  ist  es  auch  fur  die  Prognose  von 
Kapitalmarkteffekten erforderlich, die Reaktion der Wirtschaftssubjekte auf Änderungen der 
Gesetzgebungen abschätzen zu können. 
Ein  fundamentales  empirisches  Problem  bei  der  Untersuchung  des  Steuereinflusses 
liegt  darin,  dass  gewöhnlich  alle  Unternehmen  in  einer  Volkswirtschaft  dem  gleichen 
Steuersatz unterliegen. Es gibt also keine analysierbare Varianz in den Daten. Daher muss die 
Untersuchung von Steuereffekten auf natürliche Experimente wie eine Steuerreform oder auf 
internationale Vergleiche  zurückgreifen. 
Das  Forschungsziel  dieser  Dissertation  ist  eine  detaillierte  empirische  Analyse  der 
Steuerpolitik,  Unternehmensbesteuerung  und  deren  Kapitalmarkteffekte  zu  liefern.  Dabei 
rücken  in  den  ersten  drei  Kapiteln  aktuelle  Themen,  die  sich  mit  Kapitalmarkteffekten 
beschäftigen, in den Fokus. Im letzten Abschnitt wird das deutsche Steuersystem analysiert. 
Zu Beginn wird die Zinsrichtlinie der Europäischen Union (EU) diskutiert, welche die 
Koordination  von  Zinseinkünften  innerhalb  der  EU  ermöglicht.  Diese  Richtlinie  erlaubt 
Mitgliedsstaaten der EU, Zinserträge ihrer Einwohner die im Ausland erwirtschaftet wurden, 
zu besteuern. Ohne die Koordination der Besteuerung in Europa könnte ein großer Anteil, der 
im  Ausland  erwirtschafteten  Zinserträge,  vom  Steuerzahler  vor  dem  inländischen  Fiskus 
verschleiert werden und die Zinsbesteuerung wäre nicht vollständig. 
Seit  dem  1.  Juli  2005  müssen  sich  Mitgliedsstaaten  Zinserträge  ihrer  Einwohner 
gegenseitig  auf  elektronischem  Weg  mitteilen.  Jedoch  sind  Belgien,  Luxemburg  und Österreich  von  diesem  Informationsaustausch  befreit,  sofern  ein  ausländischer  Investor 
diesem nicht zustimmt. Stattdessen müssen diese  Länder eine Quellensteuer auf Zinserträge 
erheben,  welche  von  Privatpersonen  erwirtschaftet  werden,  die  in  anderen  EU-
Mitgliedsstaaten ansässig sind. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es ein Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation zu evaluieren, ob 
die Richtlinie reale Effekte impliziert oder lediglich einen Papiertiger darstellt. Die Richtlinie 
lässt  mehrere  Schlupflöcher  offen.  Beispielsweise  werden  nicht  alle  Zinseinkünfte  erfasst. 
Des Weiteren greift die Richtlinie nur fur Privatpersonen und Artikel  15 befreit umlauffahige 
Schuldtitel, die vor dem  I.  März 200 I ausgegeben wurden von der Quellensteuer,  so lange 
Belgien,  Luxemburg  und  Österreich  den  Informationsaustausch  unterlassen.  Durch  dieses 
"grandfathering" älterer Schuldtitel werden diese Wertpapiere fur Steuerhinterzieher attraktiv. 
Da  die  Grandfather-Papiere  im  Heimatland  nicht  weiter  besteuert  werden,  werden  jene 
Investoren  Papiere  bevorzugen,  die  von  der  Quellensteuer  befreit  sind,  gegenüber 
steuerpflichtigen Papieren oder Papieren, die in Depots von Banken in  Länder liegen, welche 
den Informationsaustausch anbieten. Dies impliziert die Frage, ob Grandfather-Papiere einen 
geringeren vorsteuerlichen Ertrag zu verzeichnen haben,  der die  zusätzliche Nachfrage  von 
Steuerhinterziehern widerspiegelt.  Ob  die  Quellensteuer fur  Vermögensrenditen relevant ist, 
wird empirisch analysiert. 
Aus diesem Grund werden  alle umlauffähigen Schuldtitel, welche (im Juni 2007) über 
Sparkassen  in  Deutschland angefordert  werden konnten,  untersucht.  Aus  diesem  Datensatz 
können  1.006  in  Euro notierte Grandfather-Papiere  identifiziert werden.  In  einem nächsten 
Schritt werden Zwillingspaare aus  ähnlichen Papieren konstruiert. Diese Vorgehensweise ist 
teilweise  durch  U.S.  Studien  inspiriert,  die  den  Renditeunterschied  von  steuerfreien 
Kommunalanleihen (municipal bond) und steuerpflichtigen Bundesanleihen analysieren. 
In der ökonometrischen Analyse wird anhand des "Difference in Difference" Ansatzes 
geklärt, ob es systematische Unterschiede der jeweiligen Renditen von Grandfather-Papieren 
und  deren Zwillinge  gibt.  Wenn  das  Umgehen  der  Zinsrichtlinie  fur  Steuerhinterzieher  in 
Europa schwierig ist, dann sollten Investoren bereit sein, eine Prämie fur Papiere, die von der 
Quellensteuer  befreit  sind,  zu  zahlen.  Umgekehrt  deutet  das  Fehlen  einer  solchen  Prämie 
daraufhin, dass die existierenden Schlupflöcher (bell'eite Papiere eingeschlossen) groß genug 
sind,  um  Steuerhinterziehung  weiterhin  ohne  zusätzliche  Kosten  zu  ermöglichen.  Die 
Ergebnisse  stimmen  mit  letzterer  Interpretation  überein.  Dies  lässt  vermuten,  dass  die 
Zinsrichtlinie nur ein kleines  Hindernis fur  solche europäischen Sparer darstellt,  die  darauf 
aus sind, die Besteuerung der Zinserträge zu umgehen. 
2 Im  zweiten  Kapitel  wird  die  Kapitalstruktur  von  Unternehmen  untersucht.  Die 
steuerliche  Neutralität  gegenüber  alternativen  Finanzierungsmethoden  von 
Unternehmensinvestitionen ist eine allgegenwärtige Forderung in der wirtschaftspolitischen 
Debatte. Eine nicht-neutrale Steuer verzerrt die relativen Kosten der Finanzierungsmethoden. 
Dadurch beeinflussen  sie  die  Finanzierungsentscheidung  der  Unternehmen,  was  in  letzter 
Konsequenz  zu  einer  ineffizienten  Kapitalallokation  fiIhrt.  Das  Ausmaß  der  möglichen 
Effizienzkosten solcher Verzerrungen kommt in der Literatur kaum zur Sprache 
Laut  Modigliani  und  Miller (1958)  ist  der  Unternehmenswert  unabhängig  von  der 
Finanzierungsstruktur,  sofern  Steuern  und  Konkurskosten  vernachlässigt  werden  und  ein 
perfekter  Kapitalmarkt  unterstellt  wird.  In  der  Realität  sind  Steuern jedoch  relevant.  Es 
existieren drei große Theoriestränge, die zu erklären versuchen, warum Unternehmen trotz der 
Steuerbegünstigungen  der  Fremdkapitalfinanzierung  nicht  in  die  Randlösung  der 
vollständigen Fremdkapitalfinanzierung flüchten. 
Laut der "trade-off theory" besteht die optimale Kapitalstruktur aus einem Ausgleich 
der Steuervorteile der Fremdkapitalfinanzierung und den Konkurskosten. Die "free cash-flow 
hypothesis"  stellt  dagegen  das  Problem  des  subjektiven  Risikos  (moral  hazard)  in  den 
Vordergrund. Das Interesse der Manager könnte vom Interesse der Aktionäre abweichen, da 
Manager  überschüssige  Kapitalbestände  in  Projekte  mit  negativem  Kapitalwert  (z.B. 
exzessives  Firmenwachstum)  investieren  könnten.  Dadurch  sinkt  der  Aktienkurs.  Im 
Gegensatz dazu, steigt der Aktienkurs, wenn freie Kapitalbestände in Form von Dividenden 
oder  Aktienrückkäufen  ausgezahlt  werden.  Die  "pecking  oder  hypothesis"  stellt  auf das 
Problem  der  adversen  Selektion  ab.  Gemäß  dieser  dritten  Theorie,  wird  die  interne 
Finanzierung gegenüber der externen Finanzierung bevorzugt. 
Ohne steuerliche Diskriminierung zwischen Fremd- und Eigenkapital könnte sich die 
optimale  Fremdkapitalquote  aus  dem  Zusammenwirken  der  oben  angefilhrten  Argumente 
ergeben.  Da jedoch  die  steuerliche  Diskriminierung  gegeben  ist,  weicht  die  tatsächliche 
Fremdkapitalquote von der theoretisch optimalen Fremdkapitalquote ab. 
Bislang zeigen empirische Studien, dass eine Unternehmensteuersatzerhöhung um  10 
Prozentpunkte die Fremdkapitalquote um 1,4 bis 4,6 Prozentpunkte erhöht. Schätzungen über 
mögliche Effizienzkosten solcher Verzerrungen liegen bis zum heutigen Zeitpunkt noch nicht 
vor.  Um eine Schätzung der Größenordnung der nicht-steuerlichen Kosten einer steuerlich 
verzerrten  Kapitalstruktur zu  liefern,  muss  die  Differenz zwischen  der optimalen  und  der 
tatsächlichen Fremdkapitalquote in Abhängigkeit von der Besteuerung geschätzt werden. 
3 Annahme dieser Schätzung ist, dass alle Kosten innerhalb des  Unternehmens anfallen, 
also keine externen Kosten der verzerrten Kapitalstruktur existieren,  und dass die  Höhe der 
Investitionen konstant ist. Außerdem wird auf lineare Schätzungen der Fremdkapitalquote als 
Funktion des  Körperschaftsteuersatzes  zurückgegriffen.  Unter  diesen  Annahmen  wird  eine 
Überschlagskalkulation  vorgestellt,  die  zeigt,  dass  eine  Ausdifferenzierung  des 
Körperschaftsteuersatzes und des persönlichen Einkommensteuersatzes um  10 Prozentpunkte 
zu  jährlichen Eftizienzkosten  führt,  die  zwischen  1,3  und  3,3  Prozent  des  Nominalzinses 
liegen können. 
Das dritte Kapitel befasst sich mit der empirischen Auswertung des Ex-Dividend-Day 
Effekts I  im  Rahmen  der  Steuerreform  20001200 I.  Am  I. Januar  2001  trat  die  deutsche 
Untemehmensteuerretorm  in  Kraft.  Die  zentrale  Änderung  war  die  Ablösung  des 
Anrechnungssystems  durch  das  Halbeinkünfteverfahren.  Das  alte  Steuersystem  bot  eine 
Steuergutschrift fiir private Investoren an, die ihre Steuern in Deutschland zahlten. Unter dem 
Halbeinkünfteverfahren müssen lediglich die Hälfte der Dividendenzahlungen und die Hälfte 
der  Veräußerungsgewinne  versteuert  werden.  Möglicherweise  hatte  die  Abschaffung  des 
körperschaftsteuerlichen  Anrechnungsverfahrens  eine  Veränderung  des  Ex-Dividend-Day 
Effekts  am  deutschen  Aktienrnarkt  zur  Folge.  McDonald  (2001)  legt  nahe,  dass  das  Ex-
Dividend-Day  Verhalten  im  deutschen  Anrechnungsverfahren  größer  eins  ist,  d.h.  der 
Kurssturz am Ex-Dividend-Day ist größer als die Dividendenzahlung. Dieses Ergebnis wurde 
bislang  als  Indiz  für  Dividenden-Stripping,  den  Handel  mit  Steuergutschriften  zwischen 
ausländischen  oder  steuerbefreiten  deutschen  Investoren  und  steuerpflichtigen  deutschen 
Investoren,  gewertet.  Allerdings  konnte  in  der  vorliegenden  Arbeit  nachgewiesen  werden, 
dass dieses Ergebnis lediglich auf einem einzigen Ausreißer beruht. 
Dies  lässt  die  Frage  aufkommen,  ob  die  Abschaffung  der 
Körperschaftsteuergutschriften  die  Größenordnung  des  Ex-Dividend-Day  Verhaltens 
reduziert  hat.  Da  der  marginale  Investor  den  Preis  um  den  Ex-Dividend-Day  bestimmt, 
könnten empirische Resultate bezüglich des Ex-Dividend-Day Effekts eine Antwort auf die 
Frage geben, ob das Gewicht ausländischer "Dividenden-Stripper" groß genug war, um einen 
Strukturbruch herbeizuführen. 
Der Datensatz enthält tägliche, nicht bereinigte Schlusskurse von 308 börsennotierten 
Unternehmen, die an  der Frankfurter Börse gehandelt werden oder wurden.  Im  empirischen 
Teil wird an  Boyd und  Jagannathan (1994) sowie an  McDonald (2001) angeknüpft,  welche 
I  Der Ex-Dividend-Day Effekt definiert sich als Beziehung zwischen dem Kurzsturz am  Ex-Dividend-Day und 
der Dividendenzahlung. 
4 die  Dividendenrendite  nutzen,  um  den  Kurssturz  am  Ex-Dividend-Day  zu  erklären.  Die 
empirischen  Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Arbeit zeigen auf,  dass  die  Dividenden-Stripping 
Theorie  bedenklich  ist.  Deshalb  ist  es  sinnvoll,  Kapitalbewegungen  von  ausländischen 
Aktionären  zu  betrachten,  um  zu  untersuchen,  ob  sich  die  Käufe  und  Verkäufe  von 
inländischen  Aktien  durch  ausländische  Aktionäre  seit  200 I  geändert  haben.  In 
Übereinstimmung  mit  den  empirischen  Resultaten,  kann  gezeigt  werden,  dass  die 
Kapitalbewegungen  ausländischer  Aktionäre  keinen  Beweis  für  die  Dividenden-Stripping 
Theorie  liefern.  Des  Weiteren  wurden  ausländische  Aktien  verhältnismäßig  attraktiver  im 
Vergleich  zu  inländischen  Aktien,  da  das  Halbeinkünfteverfahren  auch  auf solche  Aktien 
angewendet werden kann. 
Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten  werden, dass  kein Strukturbruch des  Ausmaßes 
des  deutschen  Ex-Dividend-Day  Effekts  festgestellt  werden  kann.  Zusätzlich  wird,  im 
Gegensatz  zu  früheren  Untersuchungen,  kein  Indiz  fur  einen  die  Dividendenzahlung 
überwiegenden Kurssturz  am  Ex-Dividend-Day gefunden.  Außerdem kann  kein marginaler 
Investor identifiziert werden.  Dies geht einher mit  der Theorie von Chetty, Rosenberg und 
Saez (2007), die zeigt, dass "drop-off ratios" im Allgemeinen sehr volatil sind und es daher, 
auch im Zusammenhang mit großen Steuerreformen, schwer ist Steuereffekte zu ermitteln. 
Das  abschließende  vierte  Kapitel  der  Arbeit  untersucht  die  deutsche 
Steuergesetzgebung nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg.  Vielfaltige Klagen über die Komplexität, 
den Umfang und insbesondere die steigende Kurzlebigkeit der deutschen Steuergesetzgebung 
beruhen meist auf subjektiven Empfindungen der Betroffenen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird 
der quantitative Output der deutschen Steuergesetzgebung untersucht. Aus den im Zeitverlauf 
verabschiedeten Änderungsgesetzen lässt sich per se nicht ablesen, ob  diese  das Steuerrecht 
vereinfachen oder verkomplizieren.  Die  Arbeitsintensität  des  Gesetzgebers  wird  analysiert, 
indem  die  absolute  Zahl  und  der  textliche  Umfang  der  verabschiedeten  Gesetze  und 
Verordnungen  gemessen  werden.  Als  Datenquelle  wird  das  Bundessteuerblatt  (Teil  I) 
verwendet, welches seit  1951  vom Bundesministerium der Finanzen herausgegeben wird. Die 
Information,  ob  eine Zustimmungspflicht des Bundesrats fur  das jeweilige Gesetz bzw.  die 
jeweilige Verordnung bestand, wird auch in Betracht gezogen. 
Die Anzahl und der Umfang der jährlich erlassenen neuen Gesetze und Verordnungen 
sind  in  den  vergangenen Jahrzehnten nicht gestiegen.  Bezüglich  der  Verordnungen  konnte 
sogar  ein  leicht  rückläufiger  Trend  ausgemacht  werden.  Im  Allgemeinen  war  die 
Gesetzgebungsaktivität  in  den  12  Monaten  vor einer Wahl  größer  als  in  den  12  Monaten 
5 danach. Zudem zeigt die empirische Auswertung, dass  die Gesetzgebungsaktivität nicht von 
gespaltenen Mehrheiten im Bundesrat und Bundestag abhängt. Allerdings wird der Anteil der 
Beschlüsse,  die  erst  im  Dezember  eines  lahres  erlassen  werden,  immer  größer.  Dieses 
steigende "Dezemberfieber" reduziert die verfugbare Zeit der Steuerzahler, Steuerberater und 
Finanzbehörden, sich auf Steuerbeschlüsse einzustellen und  ist  eine plausible Erklärung fur 
den zunehmenden Unmut über die Steuerpolitik. 
6 Overview 
Tax policy  is  one of the  most  researched areas  in  public  finance.  This  dissertation 
analyzes  the  linkage  between  tax  policy,  corporations,  and  capital  market  effects.  Taxes 
influence  the  decision  making  of corporations  and  private  individuals.  Changes  in  the 
legislation might lead to evasive actions of  corporations and private individuals. One outcome 
of  this evasive action might be that a tax increase might lead to less tax revenue. Thus, for the 
government it is essential to  know how corporations and private individuals react to changes 
in  taxation laws.  Since corporate  decisions  and  thus  the  choice of assets  is  influenced  by 
taxes,  it  is  necessary to  evaluate reactions  to  changes  in  the  legislation for  the  forecast of 
capital market effects. 
A fundamental problem of  empirically veritying that 'taxes matter' is that usually all 
corporations in an economy are subject to the same corporate tax rate. There is no analyzable 
variance  in  the  data.  However,  natural  experiments  like  a  tax  reform  or  international 
comparisons produce relief. 
The research goal of this  dissertation  is  to  give  a detailed empirical  analysis of tax 
policy,  corporate taxation and capital market effects.  This  dissertation proceeds as  follows: 
The first three chapters concentrate on current topics that deal with capital market efiects. The 
last chapter focuses on the German legislation. 
First, the  EU Savings Directive, that makes it  possible to  coordinate interest income 
within the EU,  is discussed. This directive allows EU member states to tax interest income of 
resident individuals when it is earned abroad. Without coordinating taxation in Europe, a large 
fraction of interest income earned abroad may be concealed by taxpayers and the taxation of 
interest becomes highly incomplete. 
As of 1st July 2005, member states are required to electronically report interest income 
of a resident of another member state to  that member state.  However, Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg are  exempt from  providing information exchange,  unless  the  foreign  investor 
agrees. In lieu thereof these countries have to levy a withholding tax on interest income paid 
to residents in other member states. 
Against this background a goal of  this dissertation is to evaluate whether the directive 
has real-world implications or is only a political symbol and fig leaf. The directive has several 
7 loopholes, e.g. it applies to a narrow definition of interest income only, it is only applicable to 
private individuals and Article 15 of  the directive exempts negotiable bonds that were issued 
before lSI March 2001  from the withholding tax as long as Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg 
do  not  provide  information  exchange.  This  grandfathering  of older  bonds  makes  these 
securities the preferred choice of tax dodgers.  Since these grandfather bonds are not further 
taxed in the country of residence, these investors will prefer bonds that are exempt from the 
withholding  tax  over taxable  bonds  or bonds  that  are  deposited  at  banks  in  countries that 
provide  information  exchange.  Now  the  question  arises  whether  grandfather  bonds  have 
experienced a decrease in pretax return that may reflect the additional demand of  tax evaders. 
Whether the withholding tax is relevant for asset returns has to be empirically analyzed. 
Therefore all  negotiable securities that could be ordered (in mid-2007) via publicly 
owned banks (Sparkassen) in Germany are examined. Among this data set,  1,006 grandfather 
bonds denominated in euros could be identified. In  a next step pairs of similar bonds (twins) 
were  constructed.  This  work  is  partly  inspired  by  U.S.  studies  that  analyze  the  return 
differential of  tax-exempt municipal bonds and taxable state and federal bonds. 
In the econometric analysis a difference in difference approach is  applied in order to 
see whether there are systematic differences in the relative return of grandfathered securites 
and their respective twins. If  working around the Savings Directive is difficult for tax evaders 
in Europe, then investors should be willing to pay a premium for bonds that are exempt from 
the withholding rate.  Conversely, if  such a premium is  absent, then it may be concluded that 
the supply of  existing loopholes (exempt bonds included) is large enough to allow tax evaders 
to continue evasion at no additional cost. The findings of this study are in line with this latter 
interpretation. This suggests that, at least so far,  the Savings Directive is only a minor hassle 
for European savers looking for ways to work around interest income taxation. 
Chapter 2 analyzes the  corporate capital  stucture. Tax neutrality towards alternative 
financing instruments for corporate investment is a ubiquitous demand in the political debate. 
A non-neutral tax distorts the relative costs of  a financing instrument. Thus, they influence the 
financing decision, which might lead to an inefficient capital allocation. At the same time, the 
literature is surprisingly silent about the magnitude of  possible efficiency costs of a departure 
from tax neutrality. 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) the  value of a corporation is  independent 
of its debt-asset ratio,  if there are no  taxes, no  costs  of bankruptcy and if a perfect capital 
market  is  assumed.  However,  capital structure seems to  be  relevant in  practice.  There  are 
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it offers a tax shield - as a marginal solution. 
In  compliance  with  the  trade-off theory  the  optimal  capital  sturcture  is  a  trade-off 
between tax benefits of debt and bankruptcy costs. The free cash-flow hypothesis addresses a 
moral  hazard  problem.  Managers  interest  might  diverge  from  shareholders  interest,  since 
managers might invest excess cash-flow in  negative net present value projects (e.g.  empire 
building). Thus the share price will go down. Contrary, the share price will go up, if free cash-
flow is  paid out in the form of dividends or share repurchases. The pecking order hypothesis 
stresses an  adverse seIction problem.  Corresponding to  this third theory,  internal finance  is 
preferred over external finance. 
Without tax discrimination of debt and equity, the optimal debt-asset ratio may arise 
from  a combination of the theoretical arguments above.  Since tax discrimination is  present, 
the real debt ratio differs from the optimal debt ratio. 
So far,  empirical  studies  suggest  that  an  increase  of 10  percentage  points  in  the 
corporate tax rate  increases the  debt-asset ratio  by  1.4  to  4.6  percentage points.  Empirical 
results of  possible efficiency costs of  capital distortions have not been reported yet. In order to 
provide an estimate of the magnitude of the nontax costs of a tax-distorted capital  structure, 
the  estimation of the  difference  between  the  optimal  debt  ratio  and the  actual  debt  ratio, 
conditional on taxation, has to be defined. 
One has to abstract trom external costs of a distorted capital structure and assume that 
all costs are internalized by corporations and the total amount of investment is kept constant. 
The empirical estimates of the marginal effects of  the corporate tax rate on the debt-asset ratio 
have to  be used by  assuming that this marginal effect is  constant.  Taking these assumptions 
into account allows for a calculation that implies that a difference between the corporate tax 
and the personal income tax equal to  10 percentage points may lead to yearly efficiency costs 
per unit of  total assets that lie between 1.3 and 3.3 percent of  the nominal interest rate. 
The third chapter discusses the ex-dividend-day effect2 and the German tax retorm of 
2000/2001. On  ]'t January 2001, the German tax reform became etfective. The half-income 
method  replaced the  imputation  system.  The  old  system provided  a  tax  credit  for  private 
investors who declared their taxes in Germany. Under the half-income method only half of  the 
dividend payment and half of the capital  gain has  to  be  taxed.  The  abolishment of the tax 
credit allows reinvestigating the alleged effect of the  German imputation tax system on the 
2  The ex-dividend-day etfect describes the relation  between  the  ex-dividend-day price drop and  the  dividend 
payment. 
9 size of the ex-dividend-day effect and to test whether there has  been a structural break in the 
size of the Gennan ex-dividend-day effect.  A previous study by  McDonald (2001) suggests 
that the German imputation system of  corporate taxation has led to an ex-dividend-day effect 
larger than one,  i.e., the ex-dividend-day price drop is  larger than the dividend payment. So 
far, this result was taken as evidence for dividend stripping, the trade with tax credits between 
foreign  shareholders  or  tax-exempt  Gennan  investors  and  taxable  Gennan  investors. 
However, examining McDonald's (2001) data set shows that his finding is  based on a single 
outlier. 
Now,  the  question arises,  whether the  abolishment of the  tax  credit reduced the  ex-
dividend-day  effect.  Since the  marginal  investor sets the  price around the  ex-dividend-day, 
empirical  results  on  the  ex-dividend-day  effect may  provide  an  answer to  the  question of 
whether  the  weight of foreign  dividend  strippers  was  large  enough  to  lead to  a structural 
break. 
The data set contains daily,  unadjusted closing prices of 308 listed corporations that 
are or were traded at the stock exchange in Frankfurt. The empirical part builds upon a model 
that was introduced by Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) and McDonald (2001), which uses the 
dividend yield in order to explain the ex-dividend-day price drop.  Considering the  empirical 
results, the dividend stripping story is precarious. Therefore it makes sense to look at capital 
transactions  with  foreign  shareholders  and  see  whether  sales  and  acquisition  of domestic 
shares by foreign investors changed from 2001  on. In line with the empirical results, it can be 
shown  that  capital  transactions  with  foreign  shareholders  do  not  provide evidence  for  the 
dividend  stripping  story.  Furthermore,  the  tax  refonn made  foreign  shares  relatively  more 
attractive  to  domestic  investors,  since  the  half-income  method  is  also  applicable  to  such 
shares. 
To sum up, a structural break in the size of the Gennan ex-dividend-day effect cannot 
be  found.  In  addition,  unlike previous research,  there  is  no  evidence of an  ex-dividend-day 
price drop that exceeds the dividend paid.  Finally, a marginal  investor cannot be identified. 
This  is  in line  with  Chetty,  Rosenberg  and  Saez  (2007) who  show that drop-off ratios  are 
generally very volatile and it is difficult to identify tax effects even around major tax refonns. 
The  final  fourth  chapter exanlines  the  tax  legislation  in  post-war Germany.  Public 
complaints about the complexity, growth and volatility of tax legislaton abound. Against this 
background,  an  account  of the  quantitative  development  of tax  legislation  in  post-war 
Gennany  is  given.  However,  it  is  unclear  whether  amending  acts  that  have  been  passed 
10 simplity tax legislation or make it even more complex.  The legislator's intensity of labor is 
analyzed, by measuring the absolute amount of passed laws and regulations and the  textual 
length.  The  "Bundessteuerblatt  (Teil  I)",  which  is  published  by  the  German  Ministry  of 
Finance since 1951, is the source of  this data set. The information whether the upper house of 
the German parliament had to accept the law or the regulation is also taken into account. 
It turns out that the  legislative output did not increase over the decades.  In  case of 
regulations, there is  even a slightly decreasing trend.  In general, the output is  higher during 
the  12 month before a federal election than during the first  12 months after. Furthermore, the 
legislative output is not affected by a split majority in the upper and lower houses. Finally, an 
increasing fraction of  this legislation is  passed in December. This growing "December fever" 
reduces  the  available time to  adapt  for  taxpayers,  tax-lawyers, and tax  authorities and  is  a 
plausible explanation of  the growing discontent with tax policy. 
II 1. Interest Income Tax Evasion, the EU Savings Directive, 
and Capital Market Effects3 
1.1  Introduction 
In the EU, coordinated action in the area of direct taxation is difficult to achieve, and 
few measures have been adopted in the past. A recent exception is the "Directive on taxation 
of savings income in the  form of interest payments", more commonly known as the Savings 
Directive (European Community 2003/48/EC). The ultimate aim of this directive is to  allow 
member states of the  EU  to  tax interest income of resident individuals if they earn interest 
income abroad. Without cross-border coordination between states, a large portion of interest 
income earned abroad may  be  concealed by  taxpayers  and the taxation of interest becomes 
highly incomplete. 
Against this background, the agreement on the Savings Directive has been celebrated 
as  a major  breakthrough. 4  As  of 1st  July  2005,  the  directive requires  a member state A to 
electronically report to  the country of residence B when an  individual resident in  B is  paid 
interest income by a bank in A. An exception applies for Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg. 
For  a  (potentially  indefinite)  intermediate  period,  these  member  states  are  exempt  from 
providing information exchange, unless the foreign investor consents. Instead, these countries 
have to  levy a withholding tax on interest income paid to residents in other member states, 
75%  of which  has  to  be  forwarded  to  the  relevant  countries  of residence,  but  without 
revealing  the  identity of the  interest recipient.  This  agreement became effective only  after 
equivalent arrangements have  been negotiated with third countries (Andorra,  Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, San Marino, and Switzerland) and overseas and associated territories, like the British 
Virgin  Islands,  the  Turks  and  Caicos  Islands,  Guernsey,  Jersey,  the  Isle  of Man,  and  the 
Netherlands Antilles. From I  sl July 2005, the relevant withholding rate is  15%. The directive 
2003/48/EC (as revised by 2004/587/EC) provides for an increase to 20% in mid-2008 and to 
35% in mid-2011. 
An important question is whether the Savings Directive is only a political symbol and 
fig  leaf or whether it  has  real-world implications for  the amount of taxable  interest income 
evaded.  Doubts  about  the  etfectiveness  of the  directive  may  arise  since  several  loopholes 
3 This chapter is based on the following paper: Klautke, Tina; Weichenrieder, Alfons 1.  (2008), Interest Income 
Tax Evasion, the EU Savings Directive, and Capital Market Effects, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2300. 
4 See, e.g., Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2007, p. 5\). 
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income only.  Most returns  from  investment funds  are exempt,  as  are  dividends  on shares, 
income from  life insurance, and derivatives. Further, despite remarkable success in striking 
agreements, the list of  third countries that have cooperated with the EO in striking comparable 
agreements  is  certainly incomplete and a considerable number of non-European tax havens 
are still  available  for  tax evasion. 5 Eventually, even within Europe withholding taxes  only 
apply to interest paid to private individuals, so the use of legal  intermediate entities, as  for 
example  the  Liechtenstein  family  foundations,  which  recently  have  received  quite  some 
attention, free banks from the obligation of  applying the withholding tax. 
So far, there is only limited evidence about the effectiveness of  the Savings Directive. 
In  2006,  Germany  for  example has  received a total of €144.5m in  forwarded withholding 
taxes  from  cooperating  countries  (Austria,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  and  several  non-EO 
countries) and the information provided on cross-border interest income by  Germans covers 
some €1.5bn. 6 At the same time, it is unclear to what extent these figures indicate a reduction 
in  interest income evasion. The reported income may simply refer to the portion of interest 
income that would have been filed by honest taxpayers even in the absence of  the information 
exchange and similarly, the withholding taxes may apply to interest income that is reported in 
Germany, and where taxpayers take out a tax credit for withholding taxes paid abroad. 
In  this  paper  we  study  the  availability  of loopholes  by  measuring  the  cost  that 
taxpayers  are  willing to  incur to  take  advantage  of a particular loophole  provided  by  the 
Savings Directive. According to Article  15 of the directive, negotiable bonds that have been 
issued  before  I  st March  200 I  are  exempt  from  the  withholding  tax  as  long  as  Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg use withholding taxes instead of  providing information exchange.7 
The  preamble of the  directive justifies  this  exception  by  the  objective  to  avoid  possible 
"market  disruptions."  This  "grandfathering"  of older  bonds  makes  these  securities  the 
preferred choice for tax dodgers: in the absence of  further taxation in the country of  residence, 
these investors will prefer the bonds that are exempt from the withholding rates over bonds 
that  are  taxed or bonds  that  are  deposited  at  banks  in  countries that  provide  information 
exchange. 
5 At the time of writing, talks with Singapore, Hong Kong. and Macao have already been initiated. A detailed 
discussion on possible limitations of  the directive provides the Expert Group on the Taxation of  Savings (2007). 
6 Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2007). 
7 The exemption is limited to interest income before 31'" December 2010. Another qualification for exemption 




\ The  present  paper  investigates  whether  the  securities  that  quality  for  this 
grandfathering  rule  have  experienced  a  decrease  in  pre-tax  return  that  may  reflect  the 
additional demand of  tax evaders. If  other loopholes are costly, then dishonest taxpayers will 
be willing to accept a lower before tax return on grandfathered securities that allow avoidance 
of the  withholding  tax rate  compard  to  securities  that  are subject  to  the  withholding  tax. 
Whether dishonest taxpayers who consider shifting towards grandfathered bonds indeed have 
to  accept a gross  return that falls  short of bonds that  do  not quality  for  grandfathering of 
course depends also on the magnitudes of supply and demand for the tax-favored bonds.  In 
any  case,  absence  of tax  effects  for  the  differential  returns  on  grandfathered  and  non-
grandfathered bonds should suggest that existing loopholes are  wide enough to render the 
current version of  the Savings Directive ineffective. 
While there has been an extensive discussion of the Savings Directive among public 
finance  economists,  the  question  put  forward  in  the  present  paper has  to  the  best of our 
knowledge not been addresses in the literature. Previous discussions of  the Savings Directive 
have  focused  on the  question  of whether  it  is  better  to  have  information  exchange  or a 
withholding  tax  (Huizinga  and  Nielsen  2003)  and  have  discussed  under  what  conditions 
voluntary information exchange may result (Eggert and Kolmar 2002). 
The present paper is partly inspired by the studies that analyze the return differential of 
tax-exempt municipal bonds and taxable state and federal bonds in the U.S. (see for examples 
Grinblatt and Titman 2002, Poterba 1989, and Gordon and Malkiel 1981). Due to the fact that 
the returns of municipal bonds are not subject to  tax  for U.S.  investors, the return of these 
bonds is empirically found to be smaller than the before tax return of  other securities. In the 
present  case,  the  tax  effects  may  be  less  pronounced  in  that  bonds  that  fall  under  the 
grandfathering rule create a tax benefit to an arguably smaller group of  taxpayers, those that 
are  tax  dodgers.  Unlike  in  the  U.S.  case,  institutional  investors  are  not  affected,  as  the 
withholding tax (and the information exchange) is  limited to  the case of personal investors. 
Essentially,  the  question  of whether  the  withholding  tax  is  relevant  for  asset  returns  is 
therefore an empirical question. 
1.2 The data set 
In  collecting  our  data  set we  started by  considering  a huge  set  of interest-bearing 
securities that have been in circulation in mid-2007. The data set we started with contains all 
negotiable securities (in  total  6,013) that at  this date could be ordered via publicly owned 
14 banks (Sparkassen) in Gennany. This compares to a total of  18,387 securities that were traded 
in Gennany according to Deutsche BOrse (2006). Among the 6,013 securities in our data set 
we identified 1,006 grandfathered bonds denominated in euro.  In a next step we constructed 
pairs  of twin  bonds  that  ideally  differ  only  in  the  fact  that  one  part  of each  pair  is 
grandfathered (i.e., not subject to the 15% withholding tax rate that according to the Savings 
Directive must be  retained by  Austria,  Belgium,  and Luxembourg),  while  the  other is  not. 
While this necessarily implies that one part of  each pair was issued earlier than the other one 
to  receive  preferential  treatment  under  the  grandfathering  rule,  we  made  sure  that  other 
characteristics  of the  pairs  are  comparable.  In  particular,  we  imposed  the  following 
restrictions.  (i)  Each pair must have  been  issued  by  the  same  institution or finn.  (ii)  To 
involve  the  same risk  characteristics,  both  securities  had  to  be denominated  in  the  same 
currency.  We  decided to restrict our sample to pairs of twins  issued in euro,  as this is  the 
denomination European tax dodgers should have a preference for.  (iii) To avoid comparisons 
of securities with stark diverging time horizons, difference in the remaining time to maturity 
(as of 1st July 2007)  was  not allowed to exceed one year.  (iv)  Return infonnation on both 
twins had to be available for at least two quarters prior to the introduction of  the withholding 
rate.  (v)  Finally,  price  and  return  infonnation  for  all  twins  had to  be  available  from  the 
Thompson Financial data base. A complete list of  the securities in our sample is provided in 
the Appendix. 
These  restrictions  produced a set of 70  twins  with  1,246  pairs  of quarterly  return 
infonnation. Since securities that qualifY for grandfathering were issued prior to March 200 I 
and  we  imposed  the  restriction  of similar  maturity,  we  are  dependent  on  issuers  who 
subsequent to the issue of  a grandfathered bond have also given out a comparable bond with 
shorter maturity. 
Figure  1.1  reports the differences in the maturity within twins, by counting the days 
that the maturity of the grandfathered bond exceeds the maturity of the twin. As can be seen, 
most differences in maturities lie in a 50 days band and the distribution is rather symmetric. 
This suggests that any  yield curve effects, which may produce a systematic higher or lower 
yield  for  securities  with  a longer maturity,  should  not systematically  influence  the  return 
difference among our pairs of  twins. 
15 Figure 1.1: Differences in maturity 
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Annotation: The figure  repOJ1s  the difference in  maturities. A negative difference implies that  the remaining 
maturity of  the grandfathered bond is longer. 
1.3 Evidence on return differences 
As mentioned in the introduction, if tax evaders happen to be the marginal traders of 
securities,  then we  would expect that  tax  exempt securities trade  at  a premium and pay a 
lower pre-tax return. More formally, let ,.sf be the pre-tax return of a grandfathered bond and 
rtw  the return of its taxable twin. Then we would expect that a trader who cannot escape the 
withholding tax t, but can evade other taxes is indifferent if 
or  r  =  ,.sf I (I - t) . 
With a withholding rate of 15% we would have that the return of the taxable twin could be 
17.6%  =  [1/(1- 15%)]- I  higher  than  that  of the  grandfathered  bond.  Clearly,  forward 
looking investors will not only consider the actual withholding tax, but will anticipate future 
taxes, leading to possible tax capitalization effects well ahead of  the actual introduction. This 
calls for an account of  the path that led to the directive and the grandfathering rule. 
The  first  concrete  proposal  towards  a  withholding  tax  on  cross-border  interest  in 
Europe was formulated in 1989 in Commission proposal COM (89) 60 final, which suggested 
a minimum withholding rate of 15%, but without mentioning of  grandfathering. Upon strong 
concerns about capital flight, the proposal was withdrawn in favor of COM (98) 295  final of 
4th  June  1998.  This  revised  proposal  provided  for  a  choice  for  member  states  to  either 
16 introduce a withholding tax of 20% on cross-border interest paid to private individuals, or to 
!ntroduce a system of information exchange with other member states.  Again, the proposal 
contained  no  grandfathering  rule  for  specific  securities.  In  a  next  step  the  Commission 
formulated  COM(200I)  400  final  of 18th  July  2001,  based  on  a  basic  agreement of the 
Council  of November  2000.  It favored  the  system of information  exchange  but  allowed 
Austria,  Belgium,  and  Luxembourg a  transition period of seven years  during  which  they 
would not participate in information exchange but would levy a withholding tax on interest. 
This revised proposal introduced the idea of  grandfathering (i.e., exempting from withholding 
tax) securities issued before 1st March 200 I. In the aftermath of  this proposal, the introduction 
of the withholding tax stayed very uncertain, as  negotiations in the Council made clear that 
cooperation  by  third-countries  outside  the  EU  was  crucial  to  buy  the  consent of several 
member states8  The  legislated  directive of 3rd  June  2003  (Council  Directive 2003/481EC) 
introduced  1st  January 2005  as  the date for  the  withholding tax of 15%,  but had the same 
proviso as the previous proposal: without ratification of  similar agreements with Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco, and Andorra, the introduction of the withholding tax in 
Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg was not in sight. In principle, the same proviso continued 
to hold after directive 2004/587/EC had pushed back the introduction of  the withholding tax 
to 1st July 2005, but in a press release of 19th  July 2004 the Commission announced that an 
agreement with the required third-countries has been reached on all matters of  substance. 
From this historical account it is  not entirely clear at what time the markets, if at all, 
should have priced in a differential between grand  fathered and non-grandfathered bonds.  In 
any case, if tax dishonest investors are marginal, then arbitrage considerations suggest that at 
least after July 2005 the pre-tax return of  grandfathered bonds should have fallen below that 
of  comparable other bonds. 
Table 1.1  and Figure 1.2 give summary information on the empirical yield differences 
in  our sample.  As  reported  in  Table  1.1,  the  overall  mean return of grandfathered bonds, 
measured by the redemption yield, in our sample was 3.698%9 The mean yield for  the twin 
securities was only 2.5 basis points lower and the difference between yields did not change 
for  the  returns  from  July  2005  onwards,  when  the  Savings Directive  was  fully  effective. 
Figure 1.2 gives a more detailed picture over time by plotting the mean, the median, the 25tl1 
centile, and the 75th  centile for  the return difference between the twin and the grandfathered 
bond. The number of pairs that enter into the calculation at each quarter is plotted against the 
8 See Rehm (2003) for a detailed account of  the history of  the Savings Directive. 
9 Based on the security price in  the respective quarter, the redemption yield calculates the return of an  investor 
who buys the security and holds it until maturity . 
17 right hand scale. A positive difference implies that the return was lower for the grandfathered 
security. Such a lower pre-tax return for the grandfathered security would be commensurate 
with  a  preference  of investors  for  the  tax  advantage  granted  by  the  Savings  Directive. 
However,  if anything,  the  figure  suggests that the  difference  in  returns  has  decreased over 
time,  which  is  the  contrary  of what  we  would  expect  if tax  dodgers  were  the  marginal 
investors driving the  price differential between grandfathered and non-grandfathered bonds. 
The  overall  levels of return  do  not  provide  any  evidence  for  capital  market effects of the 
Savings Directive. 
Something  that  has  increased  over  time  is  the  variation  in  the  return  spread  as 
illustrated by  Figure  1.3.  While the standard deviation in the return spread was only 6 basis 
points  for  the  period July  2001  through July  2003,  it  increased  to  16  basis  points  for  the 
period October 2003 through October 2007 and the increase is  statistically significant. This 
seems to suggest that the legislation of the Savings Directive may have led to increased trade 
and thereby to an increased volatility in the return differences between grandfathered and non-
grandfathered  bonds.  The  increase  in  the  standard  deviation  jumped  up  shortly  after 
legislation  of  the  Council  Directive  2003/48/EC  in  summer  2003.  In  the  following 
econometric analysis we will more closely look at whether there are systematic ditlerences in 
the relative return of grandfathered securities and their respective twins before June 2003 and 
thereafter by  essentially applying a difference in  difference approach. But rather than using 
the difference in returns for pairs of  twins as the left hand variable, we use the ratio of returns, 
which reflects equation (1.1) above. 
18 Table 1.1: Summary returns statistics/or 70 pairs in percent 
Variable  Obser- Mean  Median  Min  Max 
vations 
Quarterly return, grandfathered bonds  1246  3.698  3.742  2.121  10.093 
Quarterly return, taxable twin  1246  3.663  3.699  1.903  10.073 
rtw / ,.sf  1246  0.991  0.998  0.583  1.395 
Return, grandfathered bonds, after W05  700  3.763  3.859  2.121  5.066 
Quarterly return, taxable twin, after 1II05  700  3.730  3.826  1.903  5.077 
rtw / ,.sf, after 1II05  700  0.992  0.998  0.583  1.395 
Annotation: The table reports the summary statistics on quarterly data of the redemption yield, which equals the 
internal rate of  return if a bond is purchased at the going price and all future cash flows are taken into account. 
Figure 1.2: Return differences between grand/athered bonds and their twins 
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Annotation: For each pair of twins, the variable diff is defined as  tlle pre-tax return (redemption yield) of the 
non-grandfathered security minus the pre-tax return of the grandfathered security. These differences in  returns 
are plotted against the left scale for the 25"' centile, the median, the mean, and the 75"' centile for each quarter. 
The total number of pairs in each quarter is plotted on the right hand scale. 
19 Figure 1.3: Standard deviation a/return ratio rlW / r:l 
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Annotation: The number of  twins is plotted against the left scale and the standard deviation  (r_diff~ /IV / ,.sf) is 
plotted against the right hand scale. 
For the  empirical  analysis  we  define  three  time  windows.  The  dwnmy  postII05  is 
marking  return  observations  for  July  2005  and  thereafter  (I1I12005-IV2007).  Since  the 
announced withholding tax may have triggered anticipation effects we also created a dummy 
I1I03 _lI05 for quarterly observations between July 2003 ([[[12003) and June 2005  (II12005). 
The base periods, for which we presume that there was no anticipation of  the withholding tax, 
are quarters before July 2003, i.e., III/2001  through II12003. 
Column (I) reports results from a simple OLS.  While both time dunlmies for the post 
legislation periods are significant, they both have the  wrong sign and are small in economic 
terms. The results are very similar in colunm (2), which reports results that have been derived 
by using fixed effects for each pair of  twins. In both cases, the error terms show a high degree 
of  serial correlation. Therefore, columns (3)-(7) report regressions with inclusion of two lags 
of  the dependent variable. 10 Inclusion of two lagged dependent variables makes the estimated 
effect of  the time window dummies smaller and insignificant. At the same time, it resolves the 
problem of first order autocorrelation in the errors. We also tried to include a third lag of the 
endogenous variable,  but  found  this  third  lag to  be  insignificant.  When  we  include  lagged 
endogenous variables the F-test  also  allows us  to drop the dummies  for each pair.  The last 
three regressions therefore drop these dummies and we also use the acceptable restriction that 
IU  While lagged dependent variables call  for instrumental variable approaches, under rather mild assumptions, 
the  bias  in  the estimates tends to  be  small  with  a long  time horizon (see Green, 2002).  Arellano--Bond-type 
estimators have not  been  used  because of the  insufficient  time  variation of the  exogenous variables,  i.e.  the 
dummies for the time windows. 
20 the  coefficients  for  I1I03_1I05  and  posUI05  are  the  same.  Equations  (1.5)--(1.7)  use  the 
dummy post_II OJ,  which takes on the  value one  for  observations from July 2003.  Equation 
(1.6) tests whether the return ratio reacts differently for pairs of twins, depending on whether 
the emission volume of  the grandfathered security is small compared to its taxable twin. If  tax 
evaders are indeed looking for perfect substitutes for taxable securities, then the price reaction 
may be more pronounced if the supply of  grandfathered bonds is small. The relevant variable 
is constructed as  Volume*d03 =  (Total emission of grandfathered bond in euro/total emission 
of taxable bond in euro)*posUI03. Ifafier legislation of  the directive, tax evaders demanded 
close  substitutes,  then  we  should  expect  that  the  estimated  coefficient of Volurne*d03  is 
negative. As reported in equation (1.6), there is no support for this. Finally, as Figure 1.2 has 
shown that our endogenous variable shows some outliers with extreme values up to 1.395 and 
as low as 0.583, we. also tested a robust estimation. Equation (1. 7) reports the results derived 
by using least absolute values (LA V), a robust regression method which minimizes the sum of 
the  absolute  values  of the  residuals.  This  method  estimates  the  effects  of the  explanatory 
variables  on the  conditional  median  of the  dependent  variable  rather  than  the  conditional 
mean.  The results  confirm the  OLS  results  and suggest no  capital  market reactions to  the 
Savings Directive. 
Taken together, neither the observed return differences of taxable vs. exempt bonds as 
reported in  Table  1.1,  nor the  difference  in  difference  estimates  reported  in  Table  1.2  are 
commensurate with an effect of  the Savings Directive on bond returns. 
21 Table 1.2: Estimation results 
Variable  (l1)OLS  (12) OLS  (1.3) OLS  (14) OLS  (15) OLS  (16) OLS  (I 7) LAV 
1ll0UlO5  -0011  -0.003  -0002  -0002 
(0.00)'"  (0.26)  (034)  (0.29) 
post_1I05  -0.007  -0.001  -0002  -0.002 
(0.00)'"  (065)  (032)  (0.19) 
post_IIOJ  -0.002  -0002  -0001 
(030)  (021)  (0.33) 
R_dlffJagl  0.493  0430  0.493  0.490  0.588 
(000)'"  (0.00)'"  (000)'"  (000)'"  (000)'" 
R_diffJag2  0.497  0508  0498  0492  0.332 
(000)'"  (0.01)'"  (000)'"  (0.00)'"  (000)'" 
Volume'd03  34E-Q4  2.8E-04 
(028)  (0.19) 
Constant  0.999  0984  0012  0061  0.012  0.019  0081 
(000),"  (000)'"  (082)  (059)  (082)  (073)  (000)'" 
Fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Fetest FE  (0.00)'"  (0.52) 




Observations  1246  1246  1106  1106  1106  1106  1106 
R"/£seudo-1I2  0.5%  54%  72%  74%  72%  72%  49"10 
Annotation:  Endogenous variable:  r_ditT  ~  rtw / ,llf P-values in  brackets are calculated from  robust standard 
errors in  the case of OLS regressions, from bootstrap standard errors with 200 repetitions in the case of LA V  . 
•••  , ••  , • indicate significance at the I, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
22 1.4 Conclusions 
The Savings Directive has  been celebrated as  a major break-through in  coordinating 
taxation in Europe. Against this background, the  present paper has evaluated the real-world 
effects  of  this  directive.  The  directive  has  left  one  explicit  loophole  by  providing 
grandfathering (exemption from withholding tax)  for some securities.  In this paper we have 
compared  the  pre-tax  returns  of these  exempt  bonds  and  comparable  taxable  bonds.  If 
working around the Savings Directive is  difficult  for  tax evaders in  Europe, then investors 
should be willing to  pay  a premium for  bonds that  are  exempt from  the  withholding rate. 
Conversely, if such a premium is  absent, then we  may conclude that the supply  of existing 
loopholes (exempt bonds included) is large enough to allow tax evaders to continue evasion at 
negligible additional cost.  The findings of  our study are  in line with this latter interpretation. 
This suggests that, at least so  far,  the Savings Directive is only a minor hassle for European 
savers  looking  for  ways  to  work  around  interest  income  taxation.  This  stands  in  striking 
contrast  to  the  considerable  bureaucratic  and  political  efforts  that  have  been  exerted  to 
introduce the measures taken.  As a caveat, it should be noted that grand fathering will end at 
December 31 st, 20 I  O.  At least, this will close the loophole that has acted as a litmus test in the 
present study. 
23 Appendix: Sample of  pairs of  negotiable securities 
ISIN  ISIN  Expire date  Expire date 
Grandfathered  Twin  Count!.1  Issuer  Grandfathered  Twin 
ES0413211006  ES04132  1 1063  Argentina  Bank  I-Ocl-09  3-Dec-09 
DEOO02298502  DE00055 1  7700  Germany  Bank  8-Aug-08  II-Jun-08 
DEOO02131042  DEOOOl614584  Germany  Bank  2-Jun-10  1  8-Jun-l 0 
BEOOO0262684  BEOOO0298076  Belgium  Government  24-Dec-12  28-Sep-12 
BEOOO0268749  BEOOO0302118  Belgium  Government  29-Jul-08  28-Sep-08 
BEOOO0282880  BEOOO0306150  Belgium  Government  28-Mar-15  28-Sep-15 
DEOO02278058  DEOO02278538  Germany  Bank  16-0cl-08  20-Nov-08 
DEOOOl240042  DEOOOl240174  Germany  Government  28-May-1O  2-Jun-1O 
DEOOOl240059  DEOOOl240166  Germany  Government  16-Mar-09  IO-Feb-09 
DEOOOl240075  DEOOOl240182  Germany  Government  24-Jan-ll  7-Sep-ll 
DEOOOI135168  DEOOOI135184  Germany  Government  4-Jal1-11  4-Jul-ll 
XSOl18237188  XSO 168860509  USA  Bank  I-Oct-IO  21-May-10 
DEOO02330677  DEOO02738218  Germany  Bank  7-Apr-09  I-Dec-09 
DEOO02330826  DEOO03257135  Germany  Bal1k  30-Apr-08  l-Apr-08 
DEOO02330842  DEOO03118121  Germany  Bank  12-Mar-1O  19-Mar-10 
DEOO02738200  DEOO02738226  Germany  Bank  I-Feb-ll  6-Jul1-11 
DE00024  74798  DEOOOAOA2788  Germany  Bal1k  4-Mar-09  8-Sep-09 
DE000232  1  15 5  DEOOO 1196442  Germany  Bank  19-Jun-08  17-Sep-08 
DEOO02596384  DEOOOAODRUN7  Germany  Bank  5-Aug-08  18-Aug-08 
FROOO0570780  FROOOOl88690  France  Government  26-Dec-12  25-0cl-12 
XS0118728756  XSOl73290148  USA  Bank  6-0ct-1O  4-Aug-1O 
XSO 1  2404743 1  XSOl56924051  UK  Bank  5-Feb-13  29-0cI-12 
DEOOO 1381531  DEOOO1381770  Germany  Government  4-Jal1-11  10-Jun-11 
XS0098738056  XS0147372949  UK  Bank  24-Jun-09  5-May-09 
DEOO02574142  DEOOOI697134  Germany  Bank  ll-Aug-08  26-Sep-08 
DEOO02574027  DEOOOHBEOBQ8  Germany  Bank  22-Jal1-08  II-Mar-08 
DE0002574241  DEOOOHBEOBA2  Germany  Bank  19-Jan-09  27-Feb-09 
ITOOOl224309  ITOO03804850  Italy  Government  I-May-08  I-Feb-08 
ITOOOl273363  ITOO03652077  Ilaly  Government  I-May-09  15-Apr-09 
ITOOO I 448619  ITOO03799597  Italy  Government  I-Nov-lO  15-Jan-10 
DEOO02760790  DEOO02760915  Germany  Bank  17-Jul1-13  4-Jul-13 
DEOO05881635  DEOOOl609097  Germany  Bank  18-0cl-07  16-0cl-07 
DEOO07550857  DEOO07627044  Germany  Bank  12-Nov-07  12-Nov-07 
DEOO03412987  DEOOOI261386  Germany  Bank  II-Dec-07  15-Dec-07 
DEOO03036380  DEOOOAOA3RC8  Germany  Bank  7-Jan-08  17-Dec-07 
DEOO03892477  DEOO03116497  Germany  Bank  14-Jan-08  14-Jal1-08 
DEOO03458998  DEOO08087933  Germany  Bank  13-Feb-08  4-Feb-08 
DE00034548 1  5  DEOOOLBWINL4  Germany  Bank  21-Apr-08  29-Apr-08 
DEOO03454971  DEOO03250882  Germany  Bank  13-May-08  8-May-08 
DEOOOI237758  DEOO07153017  Germany  Bank  15-Sep-08  5-Sep-08 
DEOO03036091  DEOOOl47435 1  Germany  Bank  27-Nov-08  28-Nov-08 
DEOO03035945  DEOO02912292  Germany  Bank  27-Nov-08  15-Dec-08 
DEOO03036604  DEOO07627093  Germany  Bank  15-Dec-08  15-Dec-08 
DEOOO 1  023927  DEOOO 1618809  German).:  Bank  9-Jan-09  21-Jan-09 
24 DE00030372  I 4  DEOO06943582  Germany  Bank  4-Mar-09  30-Jan-09 
DEOOO3517132  DEOOOLBWIPS4  Germany  Bank  14-May-09  3-Jun-09 
DEOO03519922  DEOO07627051  Germany  Bank  4-Dec-09  14-Dec-09 
DEOOO 1162691  DEOO07935769  Germany  Bank  21-Jan-10  22-Jan-10 
DEOOOlO23810  DEOOO7266793  Germany  Bank  6-Jul-10  30-Jul-10 
DEOO06276306  DEOOOAOA24C6  Germany  Bank  14-Feb-11  IO-Mar-II 
DEOO02268778  DEOOOl663656  Germany  Bank  30-0ct-08  I-Sep-08 
DEOOO2984622  DEOO02984895  Germany  Bank  2-0ct-08  7-Jul-08 
DEOO02985884  DE0002983 194  Germany  Bank  6-0ct-08  3-Mar-08 
DEOO02987575  DEOO02983301  Germany  Bank  I-Jul-08  17-Jan-08 
DEOO02989563  DEOO03115689  Germany  Bank  16-May-08  23-May-08 
DEOO029S9753  DEOOO7266264  Germany  Bank  I-Sep-OS  2S-Feb-OS 
DEOO02674686  DE000769  I 503  Germany  Bank  26-Nov-08  22-Dec-OS 
NLOOOOI02192  NLOOOOlO2309  Netherlands  Government  15-Apr-1O  15-Jan-1O 
DEOOOl590SIS  DEOOO 1590867  Germany  Government  19-Jan-09  S-Oct-09 
DEOO03097077  DEOOO7243750  Germany  Government  6-Dec-10  15-Feb-11 
DEOOO 1595585  DEOOOl469104  Germany  Government  IS-Jun-IO  30-Jun-1O 
DEOOOl59566S  DEOOOl691764  Germany  Government  19-Jan-1O  I3-Aug-IO 
DEOOOl73591S  DE0007 I 69963  Germany  Government  22-Jan-08  15-Feb-OS 
DEOO030745S9  DEOO05520407  Germany  Bank  9-Apr-08  30-Apr-08 
DEOO03074787  DEOOOS317629  Germany  Bank  I-Sep-08  30-Sep-OS 
DEOOO3071312  DEOOOII14072  Germany  Bank  22-Dec-08  22-Dec-08 
DEOOO3071916  DE0003077137  Germany  Bank  7-Sep-09  2-Nov-09 
DEOOOl788974  DEOOOl7S9030  Germany  Government  22-Nov-10  25-Aug-10 
DEOOOl785640  DEOOOl786481  Germany  Government  6-Mar-08  16-Apr-08 
ESOOOOO 12064  ESOOOOO 12882  SEain  Government  30-Jul-09  31-Jan-09 
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2.1  Introduction 
"Financial  policy decisions  often amount to  choosing the  optimal  trade-off between 
distortions to tinancial policy and the tax benefits such distortions generate" (Auerbach 2002, 
p.  1254). Indeed, in countries with a progressive personal income tax rate on capital income, 
filII  financial  neutrality may  be  next  to  impossible.  At the  same  time,  tax  neutrality  with 
respect to  the  debt-equity choice is  one of the  most frequent  demands in  discussions about 
corporate tax refonns. 
A part of the economic literature strongly discounts the efficiency cost of tax-induced 
financial  distortions.  Proponents of the  new view of capital taxation often regard financing 
flexibility as a buffer that prevents tax discrimination from producing harmful real economic 
distortions (Sinn 1987, pp.  140 et sqq.). This idea corresponds with the result by Modigliani 
and  Miller (1958)  that - in the  absence  of taxes  and costs of bankruptcy  and with perfect 
markets - investors are indifferent to the capital structure. 
While  the  interpretation  above  considers  a  corporation's  financing  flexibility  as  a 
buffer for real  economic distortions, the  finance  literature for  a long time has contested the 
idea of financial flexibility.  This has led Stewart Myers (1984), in his presidential address to 
the American Finance Association, to  say,  "I  know of no  study clearly demonstrating that a 
finn's tax status has predictable, material effects on its debt policy. I think the wait for such a 
study will be protracted." 12 
Uncertainty about the empirical elasticity of the capital structure with regard to fiscal 
distortions  might  explain  why  public-finance  scholars  have  more  often  scrutinized  the 
consequences of the sensitivity than the possible amount of efficiency loss that results from a 
fiscal  distortion. Il In  this  paper  we  will  make  some  efforts  at  presenting  estimates  of tax 
distortions as they may be calculated from recent empirical studies. 
II This chapter is based on the following paper:  Weichenrieder, Alfons J.; Klautke, Tina (2008), Taxes and the 
Efficiency Costs of  Capital Distortions, CESifo Working Paper No. 2431. 
12  Similar doubts about fiscal  distortion with regard to corporate financing strategies were raised before by the 
Nobel laureate Merton Miller (1977, p. 264): " ... the debt/asset ratio of the typical nonfinancial corporation in the 
1950's was little different from that of the 1920's despite the fact that tax rates had quintupled - from  10 and II 
p,ercent in the 1920's to 52 percent in the 1950's." 
3  The question  of the  amount  of potential  efficiency  costs  remains  open  in  a  new  voluminous  handbook 
(Auerbach, 2002) and an extensive survey by Graham (2003). 
26 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 offers a discussion of 
the standard theories on the capital structure. Section 2.3 elaborates on the tax advantages of 
different  sources  of finance.  Section  2.4  reports  on  the  growing  literature  that  provides 
empirical estimates of tax effects on debt financing.  In  Section 2.5,  we use  the theoretical 
model of Section 2.3 and the empirical results contained in Section 2.4 to attach numbers to 
the welfare costs of  tax-distorted financing decisions. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Theories of  capital structure: a brief  outline 
2.2.1 The irrelevance hypothesis 
The starting point of the modern theory of corporate finance is  Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). Their insight is as  simple as it was surprising at its time: in the absence of taxes and 
costs  of bankruptcy  and  with  pertect  capital  markets,  the  value  of a  corporation  will  be 
independent  of the  debt-asset  ratio.  The  intuition  of this  result  is  that  the  value  of a 
corporation depends on the cash flow produced and what total risk this cash flow implies, and 
not on how this cash flow is split into dividends versus interest. 
Capital structure seems not to be irrelevant in practice. If in a world without taxes the 
capital structure were irrelevant, then a small tax preference for debt over equity would yield 
a departure from Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance and would provide for a corner solution 
of capital structure with  full  debt fmancing,  which is  hardly observed in  reality.  Certainly, 
nontax factors of  capital structure must come into play. 
2.2.2 The trade-off theory 
If indeed  the  tax  system  provides  a  preference  for  debt,  other  violations  of the 
assumption  by  Modigliani  and  Miller  may  avoid  a  comer  solution. 14  A  straightforward 
possibility is that the assumption of  zero bankruptcy cost is too heroic. Since a high debt-asset 
ratio increases the probability of  a bankruptcy, a corporation that internalizes part of this cost 
may forgo some of the benefit of interest deductibility by also using equity to avoid the cost 
of  bankruptcy and also the cost of  financial distress. 
Asymmetric  information on  capital  markets  may  add to  the  problems of excessive 
debt.  Equity  holders  carry  the  whole  investment  costs,  but,  because  of the  increased 
repayment probability for  debt, they do not receive the whole expected profits if they extend 
14  It should be noted that the sole consideration of corporate tax and tax deductibility of interest is not sufficient 
for a tax preference for debt financing. See Section 2.3. 
27 their  investment.  This  leads  to  potential  efficiency  costs,  which  could  be  avoided  by  a 
reduction of  debt. The problems that arise from a conflict of interest between equity and debt 
holders should be comparatively small  if a corporation has sufficient suitable collateral that 
limits the risk of  creditors in case of a default (Scott, 1977), and empirical support for this has 
been provided for example by Dhaliwal, Trezevant, and Wang (1992). 
2.2.3 The free-cash-flow hypothesis 
The problem of managerial entrenchment is  pervasive  in  the  literature of corporate 
governance. If managers have better infornmtion about the real cost of business and the profit 
opportunities than shareholders, then managers may fail  to maximize shareholder value but 
follow their own goals. Shareholder monitoring to curb managers may be inefficiently low if 
highly diversified ownership leads to free riding by owners. In such a situation, debt may have 
a  nontax  advantage  over equity  (Jensen,  1986).  This  advantage  results  because  debt  is  a 
disciplining device  for management.  Projects or corporations that are  debt-financed must at 
least yield a return that covers the tixed interest to stay solvent. The need to serve the interest 
on debt reduces the free cash now and reduces the discretion of managers to  pursue projects 
that foster their own interest (e.g., empire building) but not those of  the shareholders. 
One  potential  problem  with  the  disciplinary  role  of a  high  debt-equity  ratio  is  its 
implementation:  in the  absence of shareholders' monitoring,  the  disciplinary  effect of debt 
may indeed be an argument for managers to avoid debt and prefer retention policies (Myers, 
2001).  Conversely,  Zwiebel  (1996)  and  Grossman and  Hart  (1982)  emphasize  the  role  of 
potential takeovers as a mechanism that may urge managers to issue debt even in the absence 
of  powerful shareholders. 
2.2.4 The pecking-order hypothesis 
While the free-cash-flow hypothesis addresses a moral  hazard problem, the pecking-
order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) is based on an adverse-selection model. It assumes a 
corporation that  acts  in  the  best interest of existing shareholders  and  therefore  will  find  it 
optimal  (from  the  point  of view  of existing  shareholders)  to  issue  shares  if the  market 
valuation is  too high in  the light of private management information.  Hence,  in  the case of 
information asymmetries, the share market will tend to interpret new share issues as a signal 
of overvaluation, and new share issues will lead to a price decrease, which is to be avoided in 
the interest of  existing shareholders. 
28 Given that valuation problems of debt are less severe than those of equity, the share 
price decrease following an issue is  less pronounced for debt than for equity.  Therefore the 
pecking-order theory predicts that firms will use internal financing sources first and revert to 
external debt and, even more reluctantly, to new equity only after internal sources of finance 
have been exhausted. 
While  there  are  several  empirical  studies  that  find  some  evidence  in  favor  of the 
pecking-order hypothesis,15 we will in the following abstract from it.  The main reason is that 
it rather is a theory of  financing tactics than a theory of  the overall debt-equity choice, but the 
latter is required to arrive at welfare implications of  a distorted debt-equity ratio. 
2.3 Trade-off  theory and taxes: a basic synthesis 
This section extends the theory of tax preferences, as developed by King (1977), King 
and Fullerton (1984), and Sinn (1987), by imposing a well-defined optimal debt-asset ratio in 
the absence of tax considerations. This optimal debt-asset ratio may arise from a combination 
of the theoretical arguments above. According to the trade-off theory bankruptcy costs are an 
argument for a low debt ratio. Theji'ee-cash-jlow hypothesis finds it optimal (from the point 
of  view of  existing shareholders) to have a high debt ratio to reduce the free cash flow and the 
discretion of  managers to pursue non-profit-maximizing behavior. 
To describe the tax system, let tp denote the shareholders' tax rate on personal interest 
income, td their tax rate on dividend payments, and c their effective capital gains tax rate. 16 e 
characterizes the type of  the corporate tax system: e =  I represents a classical system without 
imputation  of corporate  tax  on the  personal  level,  and e >  1 if an  imputation  credit  is 
available.  More precisely, e captures  the  amount of the  dividend payment before personal 
income tax, if  a corporation wants to distribute a profit of  one euro after corporate taxation. 
Now, consider an investor who has to decide between holding and selling her shares. 17 
She  is  indifferent  if the  net-of-tax dividends  and the  capital  gains  compensate her for  the 
opportunity costs,  which arise  because she  could sell  the shares at  the going market value. 
Omitting time subscripts, we obtain 
(2.1)  DE>(l- t,,) + (V - Q)(l- c) = i(l- t p)V 
15  See Dierkens (1991), D'Mello and Ferris (2000), Eckbo (1986), or Shyam-Sunder (1991). 
16  Since usually tax  systems tax realized rather than  accrued capital  gains, the  longer the holding period, the 
larger the difference between etJective and nominal rates. Typical effective tax rates on capital gains may be in 
the range of  half the nominal rates (cf. King, 1977, chapter 3). 
17 See Sinn (1987, chapter 3). 
29 v  = ~- D  0(1-ld)+ Q 
(I-c)  (1-c)  . 
V captures the going market value,  V  represents its change over time, i is the interest rate on 
investment in the capital markets, and D represents corporate dividend payments that are paid 
from  after-tax  profits.  Following the  new view of capital  income  taxation,  we  assume  a 
mature,  dividend-paying corporation.  Let Q be  the new investment of a shareholder in the 
company.  Integrating  V  forward  over  time,  setting  the  integration  constant  to  zero,  and 
assuming a constant market rate of  interest yields the current market value as follows: 18 
00 
(2.2)  Vo  = f(D 0\1_-:d )  - Q)exp[ - 1(1;~:)S]ds . 
o 
Since we are  interested in  the cost of tinancial  distortions  rather than  in  the  distortion of 
overall  investment,  there  is  no  loss  in  assuming  that  capital  does  not  depreciate,  net 
investment is zero, and the capital stock is constant and standardized to unity. Thus dividends 
paid out by the corporation may be financed by the current earnings net of  interest and tax, by 
a change in debt, or by new issues: 
(2.3)  D  = (1-t.J[f(K) - iB - 'J'] + B+ Q. 
In equation (2.3), the corporate tax rate is denoted by tu,  the function '¥ captures the nontax 
costs of a tax-distorted capital structure, andfi.K) is  the cash flow of real capital K.  Since the 
capital stock is unity, B captures not only the amount of  debt but also the debt-asset ratio. The 
costs of  capital-structure distortions arise when the actual real debt-asset ratio B departs from 
the optimal ratio B*: 
(2.4)  lJi=lJi(B-B*),lJi(O)=O,lJi'<O,lJi">Ofor B<B*, 
lJi'> 0, lJi"> o  for  B> B *. 
In the following,  it is assumed that the convex costs of the distorted debt-asset ratio 
provide an inner solution for the debt ratio. 
Given a fixed amount of total assets, the only flow of motion is given by changes in 
debt: 
(2.5)  B = b. 
Ignoring the nonnegativity constraints, the current value Hamiltonian is given by 
18  To simplify matters, the market rate of interest 1 is assumed to be constant. The integration constant is set to 
zero. 
30 (2.6)  H  =-Q+ 6\1':-: d){(l-tu )[;r-iB -\f'(B-B*)] +b+Q}+Anb, 
where Jt = j{1). From the shareholder's point of  view, A.n captures the (negative) shadow value 
of a  marginal  unit  of debt  that  a  corporation  owes  to  its  creditors.  On  the  basis  of the 
Hamiltonian, the  influence of restructuring corporate finance on the  corporate value can be 
shown. An increase in new issues and a simultaneous increase in dividend payments that does 
not touch the basis of  financing are given by 
(2.7)  aH / aQ =  0\1~:d) -1. 
Since realistically c < td,  dividend payments and the repatriation through new issues are only 
attractive if an imputation system provides a e that is sufficiently high.  If a full  imputation 
system is  implemented with e =  I/(l - tu),  c > 0 and tu  =  td distribution of company profits 
combined with an issue of  new shares will be tax efficient. 
As derived in equation (2.7), one should notice that, depending on the sign of e (I -
td)  (I - tu) - (l - c) (I - tu), one of the two kinds of equity strictly dominates the other, thus 
leading to corner solutions in the choice of equity type (even as  an interior debt-asset ratio 
prevails). If the tax burden on distributed profits, as measured by  I - e (I - td)  (I - tu),  is 
higher than the tax burden on retained profits, as measured by I - (I - c)(1 - tu), then 8H / DQ 
< 0 applies and new issues of  shares will decrease the value of  the corporation. In the reversed 
situation it is  optimal to distribute all  the profits as  dividends and to  compensate by issuing 
new equity. We will treat these cases in turn. 
Case A: Equity vs. debt ifretentions dominate new issues 
First,  consider  the  influence  of taxes  on the  leverage  in  case  equity  is  obtained  through 
retentions. The advantage of a marginal increase in debt can be derived from the Hamiltonian: 
If  the convex costs of a deviation from the optimal debt level B*  lead to an inner solution of 
the optimal debt level, we obtain 
(29)  8H18b=O  ~ A =_6(1-1,) 
B  )-(.'. 
Another optimality constraint is given by the canonical equation of  the Hamiltonian (2.6): 
(2.10) 
which can be rewritten using equations (2.6), (2.9) and the steady-state condition/iB  =  0 : 
31 (2.11 )  '¥ I (B - B *)  =  i(  (I - t p  )  - I J  . 
(l-c)(I-tu ) 
The sign on the left-hand side indicates the  direction of the deviation from the debt 
level S*, which would be optimal in the absence of  taxes. In consideration of(2.4) we get 
(2.12)  B{ :}B *  for (1- t p){ :}(l- c )(1- tu) . 
Whether taxation favors retained profits or debt depends on whether the effective tax 
rate on household savings is higher or lower than the effective tax rate on corporate returns. If 
a corporation distributes its profits and the shareholder saves these funds  privately, she will 
receive i(l - tp)  as  an  interest payment after personal tax.  If a corporation saves, then the 
cumulated tax burden is received from the shareholders' capital gains taxes and the corporate 
tax, and the net-of-tax return equals i (I - tu)  (I - c).  The tax burden on dividend payment, 
which  is  captured  by  the  variables  8  and  Id,  turns  out  to  be  irrelevant  in  the  arbitrage 
calculation, because, with constant tax rates,  it is  independent of whether a dividend is  paid 
today or tomorrow and cannot be avoided. 19  Ceteris paribus, a higher corporate tax rate will 
tend to shift the financial preference towards debt. 
Case B: Equity vs. debt ifnew issues dominate retained earnings 
Although empirically, retained earnings seem to be quantitatively more important than new 
issues tor mature firms,  it is  conceivable to  have a tax system in which new shares are tax-
favored over retentions (see equation (2.7». In this case,  a marginal financial  redeployment 
from equity to debt leads to a zero effect on the company value in an inner financing solution: 
(2.13) 
Given the canonical equation (2.10) and the steady-state condition A  B  =  0, we obtain 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
'P'(S-S*)=i(  (I-Ip)  IJ. 
8(1-Id)(l- lu) 
Hence, from the assumption (2.4) the following condition holds: 
s{ :}B *  for  (1-1 p){  :}8(l-ld)(I-lu). 
Again,  the effective tax rate on private  savings  and corporate  tax returns  is  decisive.  The 
former is simply given by  tp , while the latter equals I - 8  (I - t,) (I - tu).  Unlike in the case 
19 See King (1977), King and Fullerton (1984), Sinn (1987). 
32 of comparing retentions  with debt,  the  taxation of dividends,  as  captured by  8(1 - Id),  is 
relevant  for  the  financial  preferences,  as  the  tax  burden on distributed profits  can now be 
omitted  by  reducing  new  equity  and  increasing  the  use  of debt.  As  in  case  A,  a  higher 
corporate tax rate on retentions, tu, tends to shift the financial preference towards debt. 
2.4 Taxes and the debt-equity ratio: empirical results 
2.4.1 Exploiting differences in nondebt tax shields 
As shown in Section 2.3, an increased corporate tax rate should increase the advantage 
of debt  and  lead to larger leverage.  A  fundamental  problem in empirically identifYing  this 
effect is that often all corporations in an economy are subject to the same corporate tax rate lu. 
Usually, the nominal corporate tax rate is  the same for all  corporations in the same cOl\l1try, 
and the variation over time is often very small20 
A possible way out was suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis (\ 980). They argued that 
tax advantage of debt should be  highest for firms that, because of other deductions like  loss 
carryforwards or investment tax credits, may have difficulties in using all debt shields. Thus, 
one should expect a substitution effect between investment-related tax relief and the  use of 
debt.  This hypothesis has been empirically confirmed by MacKie-Mason (\ 990).  In contrast 
to earlier empirical work on the DeAngelo-Masulis hypothesis that largely failed to identify 
tax effects,21  MacKie-Mason does not use the debt-asset ratio as the endogenous variable, but 
explains the propensity of U.S.  firms  to  issue bonds  or new equity on the basis of a probit 
analysis. While this approach, together with other modifications, led to significant effects that 
are in line with theoretical expectations, the empirical results fail  to provide evidence on the 
effect of  taxation on the optimum debt-equity ratio.22 
2.4.2 Studies with cross-section variation in national nominal tax rates 
A  natural  approach  to  identifY  tax  effects  is  to  use  the  debt -asset  ratio  as  an 
endogenous  variable  and  explain  it  by  variations  in  the  nominal  corporate  tax  rate.  To 
20 Along with corporate taxes, personal taxes are often changed as well, so that the variation of  the corporate tax 
rate only leads to limited effects on the financing incentives. 
21  See, e.g., Aug and Peterson (1986), Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim  (1984), Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), 
Long and Malitz (1985), Marsh (1982), aud Titman and Wessels (1988). 
22  In  a  similar  vein,  Alworth  and  Arachi  (2001,  p.  375)  conclude,  when  interpreting  their  own  results  on 
MacKie-Mason-type  regressions,  "".since the estimates relate to  changes in  company  indebtedness  [.,.J  the 
results do not provide a guidance to the impact of taxes on the debt/equity ratio, If one is to assess alternative tax 
policies on both company decisions and tax revenues it is important to be able to arrive at a quantitative estimate 
on stock variables." 
33 overcome the  obvious  problem that in  a given year all  corporations may  be  subject to  the 
~ame tax rate,  Gordon and Lee (2001) exploit the  fact  that small  firms  in  the U.S.  enjoy a 
lower corporate  tax  rate.  They  find  a significant influence of the  instrumented tax rate  on 
financial policy, using a difference-in-difference approach. The results show that large firms 
generally have  a lower debt ratio than small  firms.  At the same time, this debt difference is 
smaller in years in which large firms are subject to a higher corporate tax rate. They conclude 
that a  IO-percentage-point increase in the corporate tax rate may increase the debt  -asset ratio 
by some 3.5 percentage points. 
A further study by  Graham (1999) also tries to explain the debt-asset ratio, but uses 
market values for debt and equity (instead of  book values). The influence of  the corporate tax 
on the  debt-asset ratio is  identified by  using tax rate variations across  U.S.  states as well  as 
firm-specific  loss  carryforwards  and  other  firm  characteristics.  The  pooled  cross-section 
analysis trom 1980 to 1994 (65,429 firm-years) yields the expected positive effects of  the tax 
rate on the debt-asset ratio. The estimates imply that an increase of 10 percentage points in the 
national corporate tax rate  causes an  increase of 1 to  2 percentage points of corporate debt. 
Besides the statutory tax rate, Graham also uses federal  tax rates.  In a pooled estimation, a 
marginal coefficient of  0.24 results, while a fixed-effects estimation produces a coefficient of 
0.46. According to this latter tigure, an increase of 10 percentage points in the tax rate would 
cause a relatively large increase in the debt-asset ratio, by 4.6 percentage points. 23 
2.4.3 Studies with variations in international tax rates 
The  limited  cross-section  variation  in  corporate  taxes  has  also  been  overcome  by 
building  on  samples  of subsidiaries  operating  in  different  host  countries.  Altshuler  and 
Gruber! (2003) estimate the host country's corporate tax rate for some 6,000 U.S.  subsidiaries 
abroad.  The  statistics  of income  from  the  IRS,  which  include  industries  in  all  sectors 
(including the financial  sector), are  used as  the database. Affiliates in high-tax countries are 
significantly  more  financed  with  debt  than  affiliates  in  low-tax  countries.  The  estimated 
coefficients suggest that an  increase of 10  percentage points in  the corporate tax rate in  the 
host country, depending on the empirical model, increases the debt/asset ratio by an amount in 
the  range  of 1.3  to  3.9  percentage  points.  Desai,  Foley,  and  Hines  (2004)  also  look  into 
corporate financing of U.S.  affiliates abroad.  They use  inquiries of the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis that enable the  authors to  run panel regressions (fixed effects).  According to  their 
23  The paper provides no infonnation on whether the {<'-statistic is significant for the film lixed effects. 
34 results, a 10-percentage-point increase of  the corporate tax rate leads to a 2.5-percentage-point 
increase of  the debt ratio.  One-fourth of  this effect arises from the increase of intrafirm debt, 
and three-fourths comes  from  the  increase of debt from  third parties (outside debt holders). 
Similar magnitudes of the tax effects on borrowing have been found  by  Huizinga,  Laeven, 
and Nicodeme (2008). 
The  capital  structure  of  German  affiliates  abroad  is  analyzed  by  Mintz  and 
Weichenrieder (2005) using panel data and fixed-effects models. For a sample of  corporations 
that  are  wholly  owned by  their respective  German parents,  a linear regression of the  host 
country's tax rate on the debt ratio of  German affiliates yields a marginal effect of 0.44: a 10-
percentage-point increase  in the  foreign  tax rate causes an  increase  in  the debt ratio of 4.4 
percentage  points.  Allowing for  a nonlinear relation,  the  marginal effect increases  to  0.57. 
Induding partly owned subsidiaries in the sample reduces the  coefficients. In  this case, the 
estimated  marginal  effect  of the  linear  specification  is  0.3,  and  that  of the  nonlinear 
specification 0.41.  In contrast to  U.S.  studies, a large fraction of the  financing  flexibility  of 
German affiliates results from the change of  intrafirm credits. 24 
2.5 Calculating the efficiency costs of  the distorted capital structure 
While  for  quite  some  time  tax  effects  on  corporate  financing  decisions  have  been 
disputed, from today's point of view, empirical studies reveal a measurable, albeit moderate, 
effect on the capital structure.  Studies that measure a linear effect on the debt ratio suggest 
that an increase of 10 percentage points in the corporate tax rate increases the debt-asset ratio 
by  1.4 to 4.6 percentage points. So what efficiency costs can be expected on the basis of  these 
estimates? So  far,  the literature has been silent on this, and we  should emphasize that quite 
heroic assumptions are needed to arrive at the specific values provided below. 
•  We assume that all costs of a distorted financing structure accrue to  the  corporation, 
meaning that these costs cannot be shifted to creditors or third parties. 
•  Corporations  are  identical,  so  that  it  is  adequate  to  look  at  one  representative 
corporation. 
•  The  representative  corporation  maximizes  its  value  according  to  the  fiscal  and 
nonfiscal costs, as described in Section 2.3. 
24  Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) failed to find evidence for the influence of the home country of the parent 
finn  on  the  debt  ratio  of Gennan  subsidiaries.  Very  small  home-country  effects  have  been  identified  by 
Huizinga, Leaven, and Nicodeme (2008). 
35 •  Corporate investment decisions are assumed to be fixed,  and only the question of  the 
financing of the capital stock is yet to be decided on.  It is only this distortion that is 
singled out. 
•  The costs of  a distorted capital structure are supposed to be quadratic and increasing in 
the deviation of  the optimal debt-asset ratio B*  in the absence of  taxes from the actual 
ratio BO  with taxation. The costs only depend on the absolute value of the deviation, 
not on its sign. 
•  All  costs of a distorted capital structure that are realized by the  corporation are real 
costs.  That is,  there  are  no  corresponding rents  accruing to  outsiders,  which might 
compensate for the cost to the corporation. 
Given these assumptions, we can take equation (2.11) as a starting point to derive the 
size of the  marginal  (nontax) cost  'I"  if a corporation deviates from the  optimal  debt ratio 
because of tax  considerations25  Figure  2.1  illustrates the  information that is  necessary to 
evaluate  the  efficiency  costs  if debt  is  tax-preferred.  In  the  top  part  of the  diagram  the 
quadratic cost function  'P (BO - B*) is depicted, leading to a linear marginal-cost curve in the 
bottom  part.  Since  the  capital  stock  is  normalized  to  one,  the  actual  debt  level  BO  also 
identities the debt ratio. According to equation (2.11) these marginal costs equal i«1 - tp)/[(I 
- e)(1 - tu)] - I) in an inner financial equilibriwn. The efficiency costs ('Jl)  are given by the 
triangle B*eSO and can be calculated as 
(2.16)  'I'(BO-B*)=.!.i(  I-tp  I)'IB*-BOI. 
2  (I-e)(l-tu ) 
25  Here, we concentrate on the constellation of case A in Section 2.3.  Empirically, it is much more common that 
retained earnings are tax-preferred over new issues tlUUl vice versa. 
36 Figure 2.1.' Efficiency costs of  capital distortion 
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To arrive at the cost '1',  we obviously need the difference B*  - BO  that is triggered by 
taxation. If  we define 
(2.17)  y =. dBI  dIu  , 
then the empirical estimations presented in Section 2.4 suggest 0.14 :s y :s 0.46. This allows 
for a calculation of  the costs 'I' using the formula: 
(2.18)  'l' (BO - B*) =  -iy!J.t  p  1  (J  - t 
2  "(I-c)(J-U 
It should be noted that a change in the corporate tax rate according to equation (2.11) 
has a marginal effect on  the debt ratio BO  that depends on the level of the personal income 
taxes. However, only unconditional estimations of  y are available, which do not consider the 
levels of  tp or c.  In a similar vein, the asswnption of a linear relation between BO  and tu is not 
necessarily  plausible  and  is  due  to  the  limitations  of the  empirical  results.  Indeed,  the 
quadratic cost function  'I' =  (1/2) . a '(BO - B*)2, a > 0,  yields a convex relation between BO 
and tu. 
37 Allowing for these simplifications, Table 2.1 a illustrates for several values of  y how a 
negative value of Mu would influence the cost 'P when we start from financial neutrality with 
tp  =  til . c =  0, and go to  til =  tp  + Atu , keeping tax rates other than the corporate rate constant. 
This  corresponds  with  the  situation  in  many  important  industrial  countries  where  the 
corporate tax rate falls  short of the top personal income tax rate (Fuest, Huber, and Nielsen, 
2002).  More  precisely,  the  table  presents  the  current  efficiency  cost  as  a  fraction  of the 
nominal interest rate.  If we think in terms of an infinite-lived investment and use the interest 
rate for  discounting, this also reflects the total present value of the excess burden associated 
with one unit of  investment. 
Table 2.1 a: JIIustrative values for Wi; iltu < 0 
Starting (!oint te.  til  =  40% 
Y  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Atll  -0.02  -0.05  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3 
'P/i  0.005  0.012  0.021  0.038  0.050 
Starting Roint tl!!  tu  =  30% 
Y  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Atll  -0.02  -0.05  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3 
'P/i  0.004  0.010  0.019  0.033  0.045 
Starting ROint te.  til  =  30% 
Y  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Atll  -0.02  -0.05  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3 
'P/i  0.003  0.007  0.013  0.022  0.030 
Starting Roint te.  til  = 30% 
Y  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
Atll  -0.02  -0.05  -0.1  -0.2  -0.3 
'P/i  0.006  0.013  0.025  0.044  0.060 
It is striking that the deadweight loss  in Table 2.1 a is not a quadratic function of  iltll. 
This is due to the fact that iltu does not equal the height of  the Harberger triangle B*cBQ This 
is rather given by  i((I - tp)  /[(1  - c)(\ - tu)]-I). Because of the bracket term, the calculated 
size of the Harberger triangle is a convex function of  tu.  For iltll <0 this leads to a depressant 
effect on the size of the deadweight loss.  The reverse effect results in the case iltll> O.  This 
case is consistent with the standard assumption in the U.S. literature that the tax system favors 
leverage,  and  it  is  presented  in  Table  2.1 b.  While  the  calculated  efficiency  losses  are 
comparable  to  those  of Table  I a  for  moderate  distortions  and  liltll  I  S 0.1,  much  larger 
magnitudes are calculated if  liltll I  is large. 
38 Taking the intennediate assumption that ILltu I  = 0.1  and picking an interest rate of 5%, 
then our calculations indicate that in current values the excess burden amounts to  some 5 to 
15 basis points or 0.05% to 0.15% of  the invested capital. 
Table 2.1 b: lllustrative values for Wi; Lltu > 0 
Starting 120int tl!!  tu  =  40% 
Y  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
fl.t"  0.02  0.05  0.1  0.2  0.3 
'Pli  0.005  0.014  0.030  0.075  0.150 
Starting /2.oint te,  tu  =  30% 
Y  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Mu  0.02  0.05  0.1  0.2  0.3 
'Pli  0.004  0.012  0.025  0.060  0.113 
Starting/2.oint tl!!  tu  =  30% 
Y  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
. fl.t"  0.02  0.05  0.1  0.2  0.3 
'P/i  0.003  0.008  0.017  0.040  0.075 
Starting/2.0int tl!!  t"  =  30% 
Y  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
fl.t"  0.02  0.05  0.1  0.2  0.3 
'P/i  0.006  0.015  0.033  0.080  0.150 
To  reiterate,  the  above  calculations  imply  some  stark  simplifications,  and  it  is 
worthwhile  to  discuss  possible  moditications.  One  possibility  is  that  a  distorted  financial 
structure induces  external  costs that are  not borne by  the  corporation.  For example, higher 
corporate debt ratios may induce a higher macroeconomic volatility, the cost of which is not 
priced in a corporation's individual financial  cost.  This may lead to a situation in which the 
overall cost of  a tax preference for debt is higher than indicated by the value of  'P. 
On the other hand, externalities may lead to distortions in the financial structure even 
in  the  absence  of taxation.  In  this  case  tax  distortions  may  even  improve  welfare.  Fuest, 
Huber, and Nielsen (2002) argue that if the  market treats issuance of new equity as  a signal 
for low profitability, then it may be desirable to reduce the managers' preference for debt by 
making debt tax-disadvantaged. 
Another issue that has been abstracted from is firm heterogeneity. If corporations have 
different tlexibilities in reacting to tax incentives with their financial structure, then applying 
the average marginal effects to all  firms may underestimate the total welfare loss.  This tirm 
heterogeneity  may  also  imply  that  different  finns  may  have  different  cost of capital.  For 
39 example, a tax preference for debt may be most valuable for companies that are able to  use a 
. large amount of debt.  This in  turn has implications for  the  investment incentives that have 
been kept out of  the picture above. 
2.6 Conclusions and outlook 
The  search  tor the  determinants  of corporate  capital  structure  is  central  to  finance 
research,  and  scholarly  articles  abound.  The  present  paper  has  analyzed  capital  structure 
choice  from  a  public  finance  perspective.  In  particular,  it  has  attempted  to  evaluate  the 
efficiency  costs  of  a  distorted  financial  structure.  Knowledge  about  these  costs  is 
economically relevant, because the aim of financial neutrality may conflict with other political 
objectives, like implementing a progressive tax system. International tax competition with its 
moderating  effect  on  corporate  tax  rates  may  also  raise  the  question  of the  costs  of 
differentiating personal and corporate taxes. 
The  calculations  that  have  been  suggested  in  this  paper  imply  that  a  difference 
between the  corporate tax  and the personal income tax  equal  to  10 percentage points may 
lead to yearly efficiency costs per unit of total  assets that lie between  1.3  and 3.3  percent of 
the nominal interest rate. 
While this  is  a first  attempt to  attach numbers to the  cost of financial  distortions,  it 
should be emphasized that  strong assumptions had to  be  employed to  do  so.  Among other 
things, we abstracted from external costs of a distorted capital structure and assumed that all 
costs are internalized by corporations and the total amount of investment is kept constant. We 
made use of empirical estimates of the marginal effects of the corporate tax rate on the debt-
asset  ratio by  assuming  that this  marginal  effect  is  constant,  although  a constant marginal 
effect is not necessarily plausible. Even if one ignores these problems, as done in this article, 
there are only a limited number of empirical studies that analyze the correlation between the 
corporate tax rate and the debt ratio, and the spread in results is considerable. Finally, many 
studies  depend  on  a comparison of international  corporations  that operate  among  different 
national  corporate taxes.  Whether  the  parameter values  that have  been derived  from  these 
studies are representative for national corporations deserves further investigation. 
40 3.  The  Ex-Dividend-Day  Effect  and  the  German  Tax 
Reform of  2000/200126 
3.1  Introduction 
The ex-dividend-day effect describes the  relation between the  ex-dividend-day price 
drop and the dividend payment.  The valuation of ex-dividend-day effects is  fundamental  for 
fmance  scholars,  investment  analysts,  and  all  kinds  of investors.  Most  theories  use  tax, 
arbitrage  or  microstructure  etfects  to  explain  the  ex-dividend-day  effect. 27  Analysts  and 
investors want to  know how the  tax rate  on distributed earnings of corporations influences 
economic behavior. For this,  it is important whether the cash flows of a corporation come in 
the form of  dividends or capital gains. 
While  many  studies  show that the  ex-dividend-day effect is  equal  to  one (e.g.,  see 
empirical studies by Barclay,  1987, Bailey,  1988, Hayashi and Jagannathan, 1990, Michaely, 
1991, and Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994) or less than one (e.g., see empirical studies by Elton 
and  Gruber,  1970,  Litzenberger  and  Ramaswamy,  1979,  Kalay,  1982,  Auerbach,  1983, 
Poterba and Summers,  1984 and Frank and Jagannathan,  1998), a previous empirical result 
for the German stock market by McDonald (2001) suggests that the ex-dividend-day effect is 
larger than one  under the  imputation system28,  meaning the  ex-dividend-day price  drop  is 
larger than the dividend payment. This result was taken as evidence for dividend stripping, the 
trade  with  tax  credits  between  foreign  shareholders  or  tax-exempt  German  investors  and 
taxable Gennan investors.  However,  examining McDonald's (2001) data set shows that his 
finding is based on a single outlier. 29 
26  This chapter is  based on  the following paper:  Klautke,  Tina (2007), The Ex-Dividend-Day Effect and the 
German Tax Refoml of200012001, working paper. 
27  Tax effects are  considered in  empirical  studies by  Elton  and Gruber (1970) and  by  Poterba and Summers 
(1984).  Kalay (1982) and Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) use arbitrage theories  whereas Dubofsky (1992) and 
Grahanl et al. (2003) use microstructure etfects (e.g. the bid-ask spread and transaction costs) to explain the ex-
dividend-day effect. 
"  Walker  and  Partington  (1999)  find  an  ex-dividend-day  effect  above  one  under  the  imputation  system  in 
Australia.  Bell  and  Jenkinson (2002) analyze  UK  stocks that  also carry a tax credit and find  an  ex-day effect 
larger than  one.  Rantapuska (2008)  finds  an  ex-dividend-day  etfect  larger than  one for  Finland,  which  also 
provides imputation-tax credits. However, Skinner and Gilster (1990) also tind an ex-day effect greater than one 
for public utilities in the US from  1980 until 1985. 
29 I especially like to thank Robert L.  McDonald for providing me his data set.  I could reproduce his results with 
his  data set,  but  I found  that his  data set  contains one outlier with  an  extremely high dividend yield  and  an 
extremely high price drop which distorts the whole result. McDonald (200 I) shows that the average ex-dividend-
day price drop is OM  1.26 for a OM 1 dividend payment. His data set contains 2195 observations. Ifhe would 
have left out one outlier with an extremely high dividend yield (38,84%), the average ex-dividend-day price drop 
41 On  lSI  January  2001,  the  Gennan  tax  refonn  became  effective.  The  half-income 
. method,  where  only  half of the  dividend  payment  and  half of the  capital  gain  are  taxed, 
whereas  the  other half is  tax-free,  replaced the  imputation system.  The  imputation system 
provided  a  tax  credit  for  private  investors  who  declared  their  taxes  in  Germany.  The 
abolishment of  the tax credit provides the opportunity to reexamine the ex-dividend-day effect 
and to test whether there has been a structural change in the size of the German ex-dividend-
day  effect.  The present paper analyzes the  ex-dividend-day effects before and after the  tax 
reform of  200012001  in Gennany and tinds no change in the effect. 
It is unclear whether personal tax rates influence the ex-dividend-day effect. Whereas 
Michaely (1991) shows that the 1986 Tax Refonn Act in the US did not lead to changes in the 
ex-dividend-day effect, a study by  Bell and Jenkinson (2002) shows that the abolishment of 
the imputation credit for tax-exempt pension funds changed the ex-dividend-day effect in the 
UK.3o 
This paper proceeds as  follows:  Section 3.2 explains dividend stripping, illustrates the 
taxation of capital gains and dividend payments and shows implications of the tax retonn of 
2000/2001  tor  different  types  of investors  in  Gennany.  Summary  statistics,  the  empirical 
proceedings and the empirical results are discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.2 The ex-dividend-day effect 
3.2.1 Dividend stripping 
Under  the  German  imputation  system,  a  dividend  payment  carried  a  tax  credit 
(42.86%).  Thus, a OM  I  dividend was worth OM  1.4286 before personal income tax to the 
investor,  since  the  corporate  tax  on  distributed  earnings  reimbursed  domestic  investors. 
However,  the  holder  of the  asset  had  to  declare  her  taxes  in  Gennany.  All  else  equal, 
dividends were more valuable than capital gains to many taxable Gennan stockholders. Those 
investors had an incentive to receive the dividend plus the tax credit. Foreign investors were 
tax-penalized in that they were not granted the tax credit; they had an incentive to  sell their 
shares  cum-dividend with adjacent buy backs after the  deduction of the  dividend, assuming 
would be OM 1.09 (which is statistically significant) for a OM I dividend payment. Thus his dividend stripping 
story would be precarious. 
30  From  1973  until  1997 tax-exempt investors could use their tax credits to  offset their personal tax liabilities. 
Tax-exempt investors obtained the full  cash  refund from  the tax  authorities.  The major change in  the  UK  tax 
reform of 1997 was that it eliminated imputation credits (i.e. cash refunds) for pension funds. 
42 that the price decline between the cum-dividend dates and the ex-dividend dates is larger than 
. the dividend. 
In a study of  the German stock market under the imputation system, McDonald (200 I) 
argues that the ex-dividend-day price drop is significantly bigger than the dividend payment. 
In his sample, a OM  I dividend payment caused an average price drop of  OM I.26, whereas 
the  dividend  plus  the  tax  credit  had  a  pretax  value  of OM  1.4286  to  a  taxable  German 
investor.  His  explanation  for  this  difference  implies  that  foreign  investors,  who  could not 
benefit from  the  German tax credit,  did collect part of this advantage through cross-border 
dividend  stripping.  Cross-border  dividend  stripping  implies  that  shares  held  by  foreign 
investors are transferred to domestic investors before they go ex-dividend. German investors 
were entitled to the dividend plus the  tax credit and foreign investors received the  realized 
capital gains. Foreign dividend strippers assumed that the dividend payment was less than the 
price decline from the cum-dividend-day to the ex-dividend-day. Transaction costs reduce the 
benefits for both the foreign investor and the domestic investor. 
Dividend stripping aims at saving taxes, and it is legal in Germany. Investors can sell 
their stocks shortly before the ex-dividend-day with adjacent buybacks after the deduction of 
the dividend.  However, under the imputation system, domestic  dividend strippers were tax-
penalized in that they could not deduct losses from the cum-dividend day to the ex-dividend-
day  from  their tax bill.  Until  31 st  December, 2000,  § SOc  of the German Income Tax Law 
regularized the "Depreciation of shares by the use  of reduction of profit". This section was 
introduced  on  20th  August  198031  In  its  initial  version  §  SOc  could  not  be  utilized  for 
purchases of  shares through the stock exchange. In 1994, § SOc was revised: § SOc, passage 10 
modified  the  stock exchange  clause.  The  tax  reform  eliminated  §  SOc  effective  from  )'1 
January 200I. Consequently, losses from the cum-dividend-day to  the ex-dividend-day were 
deductible after the tax reform. 
3.2.2 Taxation of  capital gains and dividend payments in Germany 
Many studies show that the ex-dividend-day effect is equal to one (e.g., see empirical 
studies by Barclay, 1987, Bailey, 1988, Hayashi and Jagannathan,  1990, Michaely,  1991, and 
Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994). On the other hand, starting with Elton and Gruber (1970), a lot 
of  empirical studies find an ex-dividend-day effect less than one (e.g., see empirical studies by 
Litzenberger and  Ramaswamy,  1979,  Kalay,  1982,  Auerbach,  1983,  Poterba and Summers, 
31  See  Blindesgesetzblatt  (Teil  I),  1980,  "Gesetz  zllr  Anderung  des  Einkommenstellergesetzes,  des 
Korperschafistellergesetzes und anderer Gesetze", p.  1548. 
43 1984  and  Frank  and  Jagannathan,  1998).  According  to  the  latter  studies,  investors  prefer 
. capital  gains  over  dividends,  since  dividends  are  tax-disadvantaged  under  a  classical  tax 
system32,  thus reducing the value of the company. Therefore some stockholders may have an 
incentive to invest in companies with a low payout ratio. 
An investor who  sells  shares before the  ex-dividend-day has  no  right to  receive the 
dividend.  In  contrast,  a shareholder who  sells shares  on the  ex-dividend-day or afterwards 
retains the dividend right.  However, those investors should expect to receive a lower (stock) 
price.  In  the  following  model,  which  was  introduced  by  Elton  and  Gruber  (1970),  it  is 
assumed that an investor wants to maximize her end-of period wealth and there is  a classical 
tax system in which no imputation credit is attached to dividends. The variables are defined as 
follows: 
PU- 1:  cum-dividend-day price of  share I 
Pil :  ex-dividend-day price of  share i 
Pi•t- T :  price of  share i on day T at which it has been acquired 
Id:  personal tax rate on dividends 
c:  capital gains tax 
Di.H :  dividend payment 
If an  investor sells her stock before the  ex-dividend-day, she will  receive P;.H  less the  tax 
payment on capital  gains  that she  realized from  holding  the  stock [- C(Pi.H  - Pi.t-1)].  An 
investor who gets the dividend payment less dividend tax plus the taxed capital gains of the 
ex-dividend-day price minus the purchase price ends up with [Pil - C(Pil - Pi.H )] + Di.H (I -
Id). For an indifferent investor, the following condition should hold: 
(3.1)  P'.t-1  -c(P'.t-1 -P,.,-r) = [P'.t  -c(P'.t -P'.,-r)]+D;.t-1(1-ld )· 
Equation (I) can be simplified: 
(3.1')  (P;.t-l  - p,.,) =  Di.,_l(\-_':). 
The ratio of  the ex-dividend-day price drop (capital gains) to the dividend payment equals the 
ex-dividend-day effect33 Equation  (3.1 ') shows  that  private  investors  would  be  indifferent 
between capital gains and dividends if  (Pi.H-Pi.J =  Di./-l, i.e., if  the tax rates on capital gains 
and  on  dividends  were the  same.  If the  tax  on  dividends  is  larger than the  personal  tax  on 
capital gains, then the arbitrage condition suggests a price drop smaller than unity. Only in the 
case  that the  tax on capital  gains  is  higher than on  dividends  is  the  ex-dividend-day effect 
expected to be larger than one. 
32  Under a classical tax system dividends are double-taxed. The company pays tax on its profits and the dividend 
income is subject to tax, too. 
II The left-hand side could also picture a short position. On the cum-dividend day, the shareholder goes short, 
meaning he borrows shares that he will give back on the ex-dividend-day. 
44 There are several types of investors - domestic private investors, domestic corporate 
investors,  domestic  tax-exempt  investors  and  foreign  investors - who  could  be  marginal. 
Marginal investors determine the share price around the  ex-dividend-day. A priori it  is  not 
known  what  group  the  marginal  investor  belongs  to.  In  the  following,  I  describe  the 
indifference  conditions  for  each  group.  Each  indifference  condition  that  is  shown  here 
determines the share price around the ex-dividend-day if  the particular group sets the marginal 
investor. 
However, it has to be noted that the indifference condition in equation (3.1) is limited 
because  multiple  income  tax  rates  across  shareholders  are  not  considered  and  thus 
heterogeneity in the tax preference of shareholders cannot be observed (e.g. Brennan,  1970, 
Miller and Scholes,  1982 and Chetty, Rosenbery and Saez, 2007). Michaely and Vila (1995) 
show that the equilibrium ex-day price drop depends on the weight of  each tax clientele. The 
weight increases with the number of  investors in the clientele, their risk tolerance and wealth. 
McDonald (200 I) analyzes the German stock market under the imputation system and 
notes that a DM I dividend payment plus the tax credit had a pretax value of DM 1.4286 to a 
taxable  German investor. 34  To express this  in  a more  technical way,  the  simple  model  by 
Elton  and  Gruber  (1970)  is  adjusted  to  the  German  tax  system  (before  and  after  the  tax 
reform).  First,  consider  the  imputation  system  that  provided  a  tax  credit  (G  =  l~;")  for 
personal  shareholders  in  order to  avoid  double  taxation.  The  corporate  tax  rate  is  tu.  For 
private investors, indifference between capital gains and dividend payments is given by 
(3.2) 
(3.2')  (P',1-1  - p',,) = Di,l_l (1 + I~033) l;:t:  . 
Capital gains are tax-exempt if the investor holds the stock longer than one year or if 
the  investor holds a small  fraction of the  stocks  of a company,  i.e.,  C  =  o.  35  Within the 
speculative  period,  both  dividend  payments  and  capital  gains  are  subject  to  the  personal 
34The investor is reimbursed by the amount of  corporate tax that has already been paid. From 1994 until 2000 the 
German  corporate tax  rate  on  distributed earnings was  30%.  In  2001, this rate and the  corporate tax rate on 
retained eamings decreased to 25%. The tax credit rate is 42.86%, i.e., 30%/(100%-30%). This amount could be 
used to offset the personal tax on dividends if the personal income tax rate was higher than the 42.86%. If the tax 
credit was higher than the personal tax burden on dividends, the investor received the remaining amount. 
35  See EStG 2004, § 23 (I) 2.  Before 1999 the stock had to  be held for at least 6 month in order to receive tax-
free  capital  gains.  Short sales are  never tax-exempt.  If an  investor holds the stock  longer than  6 months (\  2 
months atter 1999), the tax rate at  which an investor will be indifferent between dividend payments and capital 
gains is  30% under  the  imputation  system.  From 200 lon, an  investor who  holds  his  stocks  longer  than  12 
months should always prefer capital  gains (from  a tax  perspective).  Capital  gains are  also  tax-exempt if the 
investor holds a small fraction of  the stocks ofa company (i.e., equity stock smaller than 1% since 2001, smaller 
than 10% from  1999 until 2001  and smaller than 25% before 1999). 
45 income tax rate (c  =  td)36 Therefore it does not matter in which tax bracket an  investor is. 
Thus, multiple tax rates across shareholders only playa role for long-tenn investors. 
Dividends that are paid out in 200 I belong to the time before the reform because the 
dividend payment refers to the  fiscal  year 2000 and tax credits (42.86%) were still granted 
then. 37 
If capital gains and dividends are  subject to the personal income tax then a personal 
shareholder will prefer to keep her shares (instead of  selling them before the dividend day) if 
(3.3)  (P'.I-I - P",) < 1.4286D"I_I· 
As illustrated by McDonald (2001), a DM I dividend payment plus the tax credit had a pretax 
value of DM  1.4286 to  a taxable Gennan investor.  In order to  equilibrate this  equation,  a 
dividend payment of DM 1 should have caused an ex-dividend-day price drop of DM 1.4286 
before the tax refonn of  20001200 I. Thus, capital gains would have been worth more than the 
pure dividend payment. 
Now,  consider  alternative  types  of shareholders.  Basically,  corporate  shareholders 
received a tax credit under the imputation system as  well, but corporate shareholders had to 
pay corporate tax on those intracompany dividends, so that the tax credit was canceled out. 38 
The following condition applies to an indifferent corporate shareholder: 
(3.4)  (l-t"Xp',t-l-P,,,)=(D',I_1 +GXI-tJ. 
A corporate shareholder will prefer to sell ex-dividend if 
(3,3)  (P',-I - P',,) < 1.4286D',I_I· 
This resembles the case for personal investors, A DM I dividend payment should have caused 
an ex-dividend-day price drop ofDM 1,4286 in order to equilibrate this equation, 
As  mentioned  earlier,  foreign  investors  did  not  receive  a  tax  credit.  They  were 
penalized compared to  domestic investors, McDonald (2001) takes this as  the reason behind 
dividend  stripping,  For  foreign  investors  the  indifference  condition  without  dividend 
stripping39 is 
(3.5)  (1-c  f XP"I-I  - P,,,)= D"I_I (1-t fdJ, 
36 From 1996 until 1999 the top personal income tax rate amounted to 53%; it declined to 51 % in 2000. 
37 Dividends that were paid from profits of  the fiscal year 200 I or later no longer received a tax credit. 
"  Tax-exempt institutions did not have to pay corporate tax. Since they received the tax credit, they might have 
had a preference for dividends under the imputation system.  However, their valuation of capital gains did not 
change in relation to the tax refOllll of  2000/200 I. 
39  McDonald (200 I) considers the indifference condition for foreign dividend strippers, whereas equation (3.5) 
looks at the indifference condition for foreign investors without considering cross-border dividend stripping. 
46 where Cc is the foreign tax rate on capital gains and tCdiv  is the foreign tax rate on dividends.40 
Since both tax rates vary from country to country, one cannot specity equation (3.5) further 
and cannot make a statement about the relation between dividend payments and capital gains. 
These three conditions are now displayed with regard to the half-income method. For 
private investors, the following equation holds: 
(3.6)  Yz (P'H - P',t) + Yz (1-c)(P,.t-l - P,,,) =  Yz D,.t_l + Yz D'H (1-td) 
(3.7)  ...... {! - Yz C XP,.H  - P,,,)= D,.H (1- Yztd)' 
Equation (3.6) shows that only half of the dividend payment and half of  the capital gain are 
taxed, whereas the  other half is  tax-free.  Just as  before the  refonn, dividend payments and 
capital gains are subject to  the personal income tax for private investors. Therefore, the tax 
rates  cancel  out in equation (3.7)  and should not influence the  investors'  decision between 
capital gains and dividend payments, i.e., equation (3.8) simplifies to 
(3.8)  (P'.t-l  - P'.t) = D'.H , 
and  capital  gains  are  worth  as  much as  dividend  payments.  If the  marginal  investor  is  a 
domestic individual, then a DM I dividend payment should cause a DM I ex-dividend-day 
price drop. 
The  tax  reform  of 2000/2001  exempts  capital  gains  and  dividend  payments  for 
corporate shareholders, so that equation (3.8) also applies in the case of  these shareholders.41 
Since the tax credit no longer exists under the half-income method, foreign investors 
are no longer disadvantaged by not receiving an imputation credit. Equation (3.5) still applies 
if there  is  no  dividend stripping. The valuation of dividend payments in  relation to  capital 
gains was not influenced by the Gennan tax refonn for foreign investors. 
The arbitrage possibilities that are pointed out here show that there should have been 
an ex-dividend-day effect larger than one under the imputation system if domestic investors 
(corporate shareholders or private shareholders) who  did not  hold  their  shares  beyond the 
speculative period were the marginal investors. If  those investors were the marginal investors, 
one should expect an ex-dividend-day price drop equal to one under the half-income method. 
In contrast, if domestic shareholders who held their stocks longer than the speCUlative period 
or tax-exempt investors were the marginal investors, one should expect that the ex-dividend-
day effect will not be influenced by the tax reform, because those investors do not have to pay 
capital  gains  tax  (c=O).  If foreign  dividend  strippers  were  the  marginal  investors,  an  ex-
40  Before (since)  2001  the  withholding tax  rate was (has been) usually 25% (20%) but most double-taxation 
treaties lower this rate. 
41  § 8 b, German Corporate Tax Law. From 2003 on, 5% of  the dividend payment is subject to corporate tax. 
47 dividend-day price drop larger than one should be expected under the imputation system, too. 
This had been the observation in McDonald's (2001) study. The abolishment of  the tax credit 
should then have been the death blow for cross-border dividend stripping, since cross-border 
tax arbitrage possibilities do not exist any more. In contrast, ifforeign investors (not dividend 
strippers) were the marginal investors, one should expect that there is no structural break in 
the size of  the German ex-dividend-day effect. 
Now,  the question arises whether the  tax reform of 2000/200 I did  influence the ex-
dividend-day  effect.  Since the  marginal  investor sets the  price  around the ex-dividend-day, 
empirical  results  on the  ex-dividend-day effect may  provide  an  answer  to  the  question of 
whether  the  weight of foreign  dividend strippers was  large  enough  to  lead  to  a structural 
break. 
3.3 The ex-dividend-day behavior before and after the tax reform 
3.3.1 The data set 
Using Datastream and the Hoppenstedt Aktienfiihrer I collected a sample of fIrms that 
covers  the  period  form  1996  until  2004.  The  sample  includes  1018  observations  from  all 
industries. The sample has daily, unadjusted42 closing prices of 308 listed corporations43  that 
are  or were  traded  at  the  stock  exchange  in  Frankfurt.  Dividend  payments  are  also  not 
adjusted. The sample is subdivided into the DAX and non-DAX corporations.44 Daily closing 
prices of  the CDAX45  are obtained trom Datastream. Information regarding the tax credit is 
given  by  the  Hoppenstedt  Aktienfiihrer.  The  ownership  sturcture  can  be  obtained  from 
Commerzbank "Wer gehort zu wem". 
McDonald (2001) analyzes a different sample. Firstly, he  uses a different time period 
(1989 until  1998), and he and I do not consider exactly the same companies (he analyzes 356 
German companies). Secondly, and most important, the present sample can be subdivided into 
the  time  period  before  and  after  the  tax  reform  of 2000/2001,  thus  allowing  me  to 
42  "Unadjusted prices" means that share prices are not adjusted for (share) splits. They represent the daily closing 
prices that were stated on a given day. 
43  Each  corporation  had  to  payout dividends  at  least  one  time  during  the  observed  period  (and  had  to  be 
represented  in  Dula.l'lream  and  the  Happenstedt  AklJenjuhrer).  There  were  905  quoted  companies  on  the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange in  2000 (2001:  912; 2002:  867; 2003:  829; 2004:  815) (see Deutsche Borse Group, 
FUL'lbaok, various years, Section 1.1.2). 
44  The  DAX  (Gemlan  stock index  ~ Deutscher Aktiemndex) contains  the  30  biggest  Gelman  incorporated 
companies. Those 30 companies are chosen according to their market capitalization and their volume of stocks 
traded. The sample is subdivided into DAX and non-DAX corporations, since some non-DAX corporations are 
not traded every day. If stocks are not traded on the ex-dividend-day, there is no ex-dividelld-day effect. 
45  The Composite DAX  (COAX) is  another index.  [n  contrast to  the  DAX,  the  COAX contains all  Gemlan 
stocks that are quoted in the General Standard and Prime Standard at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 
48 reinvestigate the  alleged effect of the  German imputation tax system on the size of the ex-
dividend-day effect. 
3.3.2 Summary statistics 
As  in  McDonald's (2001)  analysis,  it  can be observed that  dividends  are  seasonal: 
about 70% of the dividends are  paid from May to  July (see Figure 3.1).  The distribution of 
dividend payments does not seem to be related to the tax reform.  Most companies seemed to 
have sticked to their dividend payment day. 
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Most  corporations have  a dividend  yield46  below 4%  (see  Figure  3.2).  A  dividend 
yield above 6%  is  uncommon.  As Figure 3.3  shows, the median dividend yield lies between 
2.04% in  1998  and 3.03% in 2002 and 2003.  The mean of the dividend yield has a peak in 
2002  (3.29%)  and  a trough  in  1998  (2.19%).  Figure  3.2  and  Figure  3.3  do  not  suggest  a 
change in the dividend yield in relation to the tax reform of 2000/2001. The ex-dividend-day 
46 The dividend yield of share I  is defined as  the dividend of share  I  divided by the cum-dividend-day price of 
share i. 
50 price drop47,  i.e., the ex-dividend-day return of  share i,  has a peak in  1997, when the mean is 
.3.21% and reaches a trough in 2000, when the average ex-dividend-day price drop is  1.76% 
(see Figure 3.4). Again, this figure does not indicate a relation to the tax reform. 
3.3.3 Empirical proceedings and results 
As  a  starting  point,  I  take  McDonald's  (2001)  model  in  order  to  test  whether  the 
present  sample  confirms  similar  results  for  the  imputation  system  and  whether  the 
abolishment of the imputation system changes results. McDonald (2001) builds upon a model 
that was introduced by Boyd and Jagannathan (1994), which uses the dividend yield in order 
to explain the ex-dividend-day price drop48: 
(3.9)  PI.'~I-PI.'  = a  + fJ ~  +  U 
J 1.1_1  P..,_I  1,1-1  . 
To remove the seasonality from  ordinary days, McDonald (2001) adds the return of 
the CDAX ({~~X  ) to the ex-dividend-day price drop. The return of  the CDAX is defined as 
the value of  the CDAX on firm i's cum-dividend-day minus the value of the CDAX on fmu 
i's ex-dividend-day, divided by the CDAX value on the cum-dividend-day of tirm i.  Inserting 
the return of the CDAX into equation (3.9) amounts to deducting the market returns, so that 
market effects are  removed.  Price drops  due  to  dividend payments are  corrected for  in  the 
CDAX.  Controlling  for  the  market reutn  is  necessary  to  essentially  construct  an  accurate 
counterfactual of what the price change would have been had a firm not gone ex-dividend on 
that day. In other words, the CDAX helps to remove the noise caused by general fluctuations 
of  the market49 Then we have 
(3.9') 
P,.H -P,.1  + r CDAX 
Pi,t-I  t,I-I 
In order to test whether there has been a structural break in the ex-dividend-day price 
drop in relation to the tax reform, the sample is subdivided into the period before and after the 
tax  reform,  so  that  the  estimated  price  drop  ratios  before  and  after  the  reform  can  be 
compared. If  domestic shareholders (private or corporate) who did not hold their stocks longer 
then  the  speculative  period or foreign  dividend  strippers  are  the  marginal  investors,  one 
should  expect  a  decline  in  the  ex-dividend-day  price  drop,  and  the  slope  coefficients  (~) 
47 The ex-dividend-day price drop of share 1 is the difference between the cum-dividend-day price of share i aud 
the ex-dividend-day price of share I, divided by the cum-dividend-day price of share I. 
48 The variables are defIned as in Section 3.2.2. 
49 It should be noted that using the CDAX in equation (3.9') leads to a small imprecision since a corporation that 
goes ex-dividend is also included in  the observation on  its ex-dividend-day.  With 673  firms  in  the CDAX, the 
problem should be minor. 
51 should be  significantly  different.  On the  other hand,  if domestic  investors  who  hold their 
shares  longer  than  six  (or twelve) months,  tax-exempt  investors  or  foreign  non-dividend-
strippers  are  the  marginal  investors,  one  should expect that  the  slope coefficients  are  not 
significantly different. 
The equation 
l~,H-P;J  CDAX  + a  D'J-l  DU_l  vE'A 1)  + ~E'A  1)  + 
(3.10) -p-.  - +  '" 1-1  =  a  fJ1 -p-+ r  -p-.I.,  "02-04  U.I. ,  "'02-04  Uj  1-1 
/,1-1'  1,1-1  I,t-I  ' 
estimates the  slope coefficient before the  reform (PI)  and the difference between the  slope 
coefficient after the retorm and the slope coetlicient before the reform y =  (P2 - PI)' If  PI  and 
P2  are signiticantly different from  I, then there is  a  structural break in  the  size of the  ex-
dividend-day  effect.  YEARo2_ 04  is  a  time  dummy  for  the  period  after  the  tax  reform  of 
2000/200 I.  If there is  no structural break, there should be no significant difference between 
the  unrestricted  sum of squares  for  the  whole  sample  and  the  restricted  sum  of squares. 
Testing whether the coefficients are the same (PI  =  P2) is obviously equivalent to testing Ho:  y 
=0. 
Table 3.1: (Robust) OLS estimates 
Variable  DAX  Non-DAX 
II  -0.002340  -0.002034 
(0.003450)  (0.001734) 
lit  1.114233'"  0.972076'" 
(0.140682)  (0.061754) 
Y  -0.\33516  0,027064 
(0,187333)  (0.194218) 
Ii  -0001417  -0.000833 
(0005180)  (0005616) 
Observations  144  874 
Ji2  0.2930  0.3290 
Chow test for the whole sample: 























Annotation: Heteroskedasticily-robust standard errors are in parenthesis, *** significant at the 1% level, .... significant at the 5% level, '" 
Significant at the J  0% level 
Table 3.1  presents the OLS estimates of equation (3.10).  It can be seen that a DM  I 
dividend payment caused an average price drop of DM 0.97 before the reform and DM 1.00 
after the reform. y is always insignificant, meaning that the difference between PI  and P2 is not 
significantly different from O.  PI  and P2  are not significantly different from  1.  The magnitude 
of  /)(-0.0015) is insignificant. The null hypothesis of  the Chow test (Chow 1960), that there is 
'" Since thin trading among the nOll-DAX stock might generate a dOWIlward bias, "Trade" excludes stocks that 
report llO price change from the cum-day to the ex-day. 
52 no structural break, cannot be rejected. There is no difference in the ex-dividend-day effect in 
connection with the tax reform. 51 
As mentioned by McDonald (2001), equation (3.10) ignores an important fact.  Under 
the imputation system some dividends did not carry a tax credit. 52 This was the case if they 
were paid out of  "Equity 0" (EK 0),  which had not been subject to any tax before. Here, the 
market may have reacted differently than it would have if  the dividends had been paid out of 
EK45 or EK4053 Then we have 
P',I-,-P"t  +  rCDAX 
p/,t-j  1,1-1  D  fJ  D'H  fJ  D"_i  D  = a 0  + a 1  credit  +  0  -p-'-+  1 -p-'- credit 
/,1-1  /,1-1 
(3.11) + r  D,.H  YEAR 
P"t-l  02-04  + JYEAR  02-04  + U i ,t-1' 
Here,  Defedll  is  a  dummy  variable  that  is  I  if the  dividend  carried  a  credit  and  0 
otherwise. YEARo 2-!J4 is another dummy that is  I  if the dividend is paid out after the reform 
and 0 otherwise. Equation (3.11) assumes that all dividends that carried a tax credit have the 
same intercept in all the observed years, but allows for a change of the slope coefficient for 
dividends without a tax credit in response to the tax reform. For dividends without a tax credit 
that were paid out before the reform,  Cto is the intercept and flo is the slope coefficient, Cto + III 
is the intercept for dividends that were paid out before 2002 and carried a tax credit, flo + /l1 is 
the  slope  coefficient for  such dividends,  and y estimates  the  difference  between the  slope 
coefficients for dividends without a credit that were paid out after the reform and before the 
reform. 
Table 3.2 contains the OLS estimates of  equation (3.11). Under the imputation system, 
dividends that carry a tax credit had an average price drop of DM 0.89 for a DM 1 dividend 
payment. Dividends without a credit caused an average price drop of DM 1.07 in the period 
from  1996 to 2001. After the reform a DM 1 dividend payment caused an ex-dividend-day 
price drop of DM 1.00.  The  fact  that  /l1  is  insignificant shows  that there  is  no  significant 
difference between a dividend that received  a tax credit before the  reform and  a dividend 
51  I also checked whether different industries correlated diferently with the market. Therefore I produced separate 
estimates at the industry level. I subdivided the sample into four industries (1: biotech, IT, phanna; 2,: industry, 
car;  3.:  food,  household, fashion  and 4:  other),  It turns out that all  subsamples have a similar ex-dividend-day 
effect aud there is no difference in the ex-dividend-day etrect in connection with the tax refonn, 
52  In  1996, only  I dividend payment in  my sample did not carry the tax credit. However, the number of dividend 
payments that did not carry the tax credit increased (in my  sample) over the years,  In  1997 (1998,1999,2000 
aud 2001) 3 dividend payments did not carry the tax credit (8, 21, 22 and 22), Therefore it is better to pool these 
payments in  equation (3,11). Blasch (2008, p.75ff) shows that dividend payments out of EK  0 depend on the 
ownership  structure,  His  argument  was  that finns  with  a foreign  principal  shareholder lIIore  often  paid  out 
dividends from EK 0, since foreign investors (not dividend strippers) could not use the tax credit. 
53  The tax rate on retained earnings was 45% from  1996 until  1998,40% from  1999 until 2000, aud 25% from 
2001  on. Equity that had been subject to a 45% (40%) corporate tax rate was declared as EK45 (EK40). 
53 payment that did not get the credit before the tax reform 2000/200 I.  The Chow test shows 
that there is no structural break in the size of  the ex-dividend-day effect. 
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Annotation: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis, "·s.ignificant at the 1%  level,·· significant at the 5%  level,· 
significant at the I  0% leveL 
So far, all the econometric evidence suggests that the price drop per OM of  dividends 
underwent no statistically significant change due to the German tax reform of2000/2001. The 
tax reform obviously did not influence the ex-dividend-day effect in Germany. Since only the 
marginal investor can set the price around the ex-dividend-day, the marginal investor has to 
be someone who is not affected by the capital gains tax.  Section 3.2.2 showed alternative 
indifference conditions for  different kinds of investors.  The empirical  results  suggest that 
either  domestic  investors  who  did  not  have  to  pay  tax  on  capital  gains,  tax-exempt 
institutions, or foreign investors who are not dividend strippers are the marginal investors in 
Germany.  The German tax reform of 2000/2001  did not influence the marginal  investors' 
arbitrage calculus with respect to dividend payments and capital gains. For domestic investors 
who do not have to pay tax on capital gains, the tax reform would not have affected their 
decision,  because they only pay tax on dividends.  For German investors who did not hold 
their stocks longer than the speCUlative period, the tax reform appreciated capital  gains in 
relation  to  dividend  payments.  Since  the  ex-dividend-day  effect  did  not  change,  those 
investors seem not to be the marginal investors who set the price around the ex-dividend-day. 
In order to see whether there is a clientele effect the ownership structure is observed. 
Therefore  I  constructed two  subsamples,  where  (i)  the  largest  investor  is  subject  to  the 
personal income tax (tax-exempt investors are excluded) and (ii) where the largest investor is 
54 
\ , subject to  the  corporate tax.  Table 3.3  shows that the  average price  drop  is  DM  1.11  (DM 
0.95) before (after) the refonn for corporations, where the largest shareholder is subject to the 
personal income tax and DM 1.02 (DM 0.96) for corporations, where the largest shareholder 
is  subject to  the  corporate tax.  Thus,  it  can  be  concluded that  I cannot identifY  a marginal 
investor, since I concluded before that either domestic investors who held their stocks longer 
than  six  (or  twelve)  months,  tax-exempt  institutions,  or  foreign  inbestors  (no  dividend 
strippers)  are  the  marginal  investors  in  Gennany.  However,  Table  3.3  just showed  that 
corporate investors did not change their arbitrage calculus with respect to dividend payments 
and capital gains.  This suggests that the dividend payment does not depend on  the marginal 
investor. This is in line with Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez (2007) who show that drop-off ratios 
are  generally  very  volatile and  it  is  difficult to  identifY  tax effects even  around major  tax 
refonns. 
Table 3.3: (Robust) OLS estimates - Ownership structure 
Variable  Income Tax54  Corporate Tax55 
II  -0.005236  -0.003914 
(0.003498)  (0.001786) 
~l  1.114609'**  1.018857*" 
(0.139382)  (0.061660) 
1  -0.150975  -0.062183 
(0.221002)  (0.163142) 
/)  0.007405  0.000819 
(0.006211)  (0.005123) 
Observations  349  494 
if  0.2761  0.3921 
Annotation: H~teroskedasucily-robust standard errors are in parenthesIs, h* significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, '" 
significant at the]  0% level 
One reason why my results are different from  the  one found by McDonald (2001),  is 
that his data set includes very large dividends, so that dividend stripping activities were more 
likely.  Transaction costs  carry  less  weight  for  large  dividend payments compared  to  small 
dividend  payments.  Investment  managers  might  have  engaged  in  some  form  of dividend 
stripping if the  dividends were  very  large.  Especially in  1994,  companies  might have paid 
large  dividends.  Until  1994,  the  tax  rate  on  distributed  earnings  was  36%,  i.e.  dividends 
54 "Income Tax" includes only onbservations where the largest shareholder is subject to the personal income tax. 
I  also  checked  whether  the  results  change  if the  sample  includes  only  observation  where  the  dominant 
shareholder, who holds more than 50% of the shares, is subject to the personal income tax.  [t turns out that the 
ex-dividend-day price-drop is almost the same for that sample. [t is reasonable to assume that those investors are 
in the highest tax bracket. 
55 "Corporate Tax" includes observations, if  the largest shareholder is subject to the corporate tax. I also checked 
whether the results change if the sample includes only observation where the dominant shareholder, who holds 
more than 50% of the shares, is subject to the corporate tax. It turns out that the ex-dividend-day price-drop is 
almost the same for that sample. 
55 obtained a 56.25% tax credit. 56  In  1994,  the tax rate on distributed earnings went down to 
30%. Dividends that were paid out in  1994 from profits of the fiscal year 1993 still obtained 
the higher tax credit. It might be possible that some companies paid out large dividends in 
1994,  so  that some investors (e.g.,  tax-exempt investors)  could benefit  from  the  larger tax 
credit. 
As mentioned earlier, McDonald's (2001) data set is  not robust.  His data set contains 
one  outlier  that  distorts  the  whole  result.  Actually,  this  outlier  with  an  extremely  high 
dividend  yield and an extremely high price drop  can be  observed in  1994.  It can only be 
speculated  that  the  change  in  the  tax  credit  rate  was  the  driving  force  behind  this.  If 
McDonald (2001) would have left out this one outlier, he and I would have received similar 
results; a OM I dividend payment would have caused an average ex-dividend-day price drop 
of OM 1.09, which is  not significantly different form  1.  Thus, his  dividend stripping story 
would be precarious. 
The present data set does not include very large dividends. Appendix I shows that the 
average price drop before the reform (after the reform) is OM 0.96 (OM 0.99) for a 'normal' 
dividend and OM 1.01  (OM 1.11) for a 'large' dividend. I cannot find a significant difference 
between 'normal' and 'large' dividends. 
3.3.4 Shareholders of  German shares 
Section 3.3.3 provided no evidence for a structural break in the size of  the German ex-
dividend-day  effect.  Considering  my  empirical  results,  the  dividend  stripping  story  is 
precarious. Therefore it makes sense to look at capital transactions with foreign shareholders 
and see whether sales and acquisition of domestic shares by  foreign  investors changed from 
2001  on. 
The  tax  reform  of 20001200 I  made  toreign  shares  relatively  more  attractive  to 
domestic investors.  Whereas the imputation system did  not provide a tax credit for  foreign 
shares held by domestic investors, the half-income method is  also applicable to such shares. 
Foreign shares held by domestic investors are no longer tax-disadvantaged. It is plausible that 
domestic shareholders are investing more in foreign stocks and might have exchanged some 
of  their domestic shares tor foreign shares. On the other hand, toreign investors are no longer 
tax-penalized. The imputation system generated a significant cost to foreign investors that did 
not actively trade away the dividend, so one would expect volumes to  increase post-reform, 
since foreign investors might invest more in German stocks. 
56 G = [tuf(1  - t")], i.e., [36%/(100% - 36%)] = 56.25% 
56 Figure  3.5  provides  an  overview  of the  custody  account  statistic57  This  chart 
illustrates the volume of  German stocks that are held by foreign investors, domestic investors, 
and domestic individual investors in German deposits. However, it cannot be seen how many 
German stocks are held in foreign deposits. The custody account statistic shows that shares 
owned by  foreign  investors  increased from  EUR  136,439 million in  1996  to  EUR 405,368 
million in  2004.  It can be  recognized that the  proportion of foreign depositors  to  domestic 
investors  increased over time.  Whereas  in  1996  only 23.7% of domestic shares (in German 
deposits) were in the possession of foreign investors, that fraction increased to 40% in 2004 
(Figure 3.5). 
Figure 3.5: Custody account statistic 
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Figure 3.6 displays the sales and acquisitions  58 of domestic shares by foreign investors 
from  1996  to  2004.  This  figure  seems  to  be  consistent with  foreign  investors  being  more 
willing  to  hold  German  stocks  in  2000  once  they  had  gone  ex-dividend  for  that  year.  If 
dividend stripping depends on the tax credit, one would expect that the  capital transactions 
with  foreign  investors  went  down  after  the  tax  reform.  Capital  transactions  with  foreign 
57 Data is provided by the Gennan Central Bank. In  1996,62.6% (1997: 62.8%; 1998: 62.3%; 1999: 63%; 2000: 
63.4%;  2001:  63.4%;  2002:  54.9%;  2003:  57.3%;  2004:  55.6%) of all  German  stocks were  held  in  Gennan 
deposits. 
"  Data  is  provided by  the Gennan Central  Bank.  The sales and  acquisitions  of domestic  shares  by  foreign 
investors represent the capital transactions (sales and acquisitions) with foreign shareholders. 
57 investors do not provide evidence that foreign  investors cut down on dividend stripping.  In 
line with the empirical results, capital transactions with foreign shareholders do  not provide 
evidence for the dividend stripping story. 
Figure 3.6: Sales and acquisitions of  domestic shares by  foreign investors 
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3.4. Conclusions 
The  recent  abolishment  of the  imputation  system  in  Germany  offers  a  good 
opportunity  to  reinvestigate  the  ex-dividend-day  effect.  The  present  paper  has  analyzed 
possible influences of the ex-dividend-day effects in the German stock market with respect to 
the tax reform of 2000/200 I, where the half-income method replaced the imputation system. 
As a starting point, I used McDonald's (2001) empirical study that concludes that a OM 1 
dividend payment caused an average ex-dividend-day price drop of OM 1.26 in the German 
imputation system. He argues that there are cross-border arbitrage possibilities. While a OM I 
dividend had a pretax value of OM  1.4286 under the imputation system, a marginal foreign 
shareholder could reap less if  dividend stripping is costly. 
Apart from the fact that I could not reproduce an ex-dividend-day effect significantly 
larger than one before the reform, the paper also failed to find a structural break after 200 I, 
which should have occurred if  before 2001  the imputation system was responsible for a larger 
ex-dividend-day  effect. 59  The  ratio  of  price  drop  to  dividend  payment  remained 
"  I could not reproduce an ex-dividend-day effect larger than one with my data set, but I could reproduce an ex-
dividend-day etYect larger than one with Robert L. McDonald's data set. 
58 approximately  I: I. I  could  not  identify  a  marginal  investor.  This  is  in  line  with  Chetty, 
Rosenberg  and Saez (2007)  who conclude  that  it  is  impossible  to  detect tax effects,  even 
around large tax reforms. 
Appendix: CUSUM test for large dividends 
Because of transaction cost of finding partners for  dividend stripping and conducting 
the  transactions,  investors  may  engage  in  dividend  stripping  if the  dividend  payment  is 
sufficiently large. To test the hypothesis that 'large' dividends have a larger ex-dividend-day 
price drop than  'normal'  dividends I define a dividend as  being large  if it  is  significantly 
larger than average, i.e. are two standard errors above average. The equation 
P;.t-I-P;.t +rCDAX =a+ R  Di.t-I +r Dil- 1 Large+bLarge+u 
(3.12)  P;,H  1,1-1  fJI  P;,t-I  P;,t-I  1,1-1 
estimates the slope coefficient of a 'normal' dividend ~l and the difference between the slope 
coefficient ofa 'large' dividend (~2) and a 'normal' dividend y =  (~2 - ~l)' Large is a dummy 
for  large dividends,  which  is  1 if the  dividend belongs to  the  5% largest dividends  in  the 
sample  and  0  otherwise.  Again,  I  want  to  test  whether  the  coefficients  ~l  and  ~2 are 
significantly different (Ho: y =0). 






























i) before the reform: Ho:  ~l =  ~2: F-statistic: F(I, 745) =  0.15;  (Prob> F) = 0.7009 
ii) after the reform:  Ho:  Rl  =  R2:  F-statistic: F(I, 265) =  017;  (Prob > F) =  0.6818 
Annotation: Heteroskedasticu}'Mrobust standard errors are in parenthesis, ·"significant at  the  1  %  level, ** significant at  the 5%  level," 
slgJUficant at the 10% level 
Table 3.4 shows that the average price drop is DM 0.96 (DM 0.99) before (after) the 
reform for  a  'normal' dividend  and DM  1.01  (DM  1.11) for  a 'large' dividend,  y is  never 
significant, i.e., the difference between ~l and  ~2 is not significant ditJerent from O.  ~l and  ~2 
59 are  not significantly different from  I.  The  Chow test illustrates that there  is  no  significant 
difference  in  the  ex-dividend-day  effect  between  'normal'  and  'large'  dividends  in  this 
sample, neither before nor after the reform. 
Since there is  uncertainty about the point at  which a possible structural break in the 
regression equation might occur, I am also running a CUSUM and a CUSUMSQ test of the 
stability.  It turns  out that the both tests accept the  null hypothesis that there  is  no  structural 




• 4. Das steuerpolitische Dezemberfieber: 
Steuergesetzgebung in Deutschland von 1951-2004
60 
4.1  Einleitung 
Das  deutsche  Steuerrecht  gilt  als  eines  der  kompliziertesten  der  Welt,  Häufig  geäußerte 
Behauptungen,nl  nach  denen  bis  zu  80 %  der  weltweiten  Steuerliteratur  aus  Deutschland 
stammt, wurden zwar mittlerweile widerlegt. Doch auch der tatsächliche Wert von 10 bis 20% 
sorgt dafür, dass Deutschland in dieser Hinsicht nach wie vor eine Spitzenstellung in der Welt 
einnimmt (Rädler,  2004).  Die  Forderung nach einer Vereinfachung der Steuergesetzgebung 
ist  vor  diesem  Hintergrund  allgegenwärtig:  Unternehmer  klagen  über  den  deutschen 
Steuerdschungel, und auch der gemeine Steuerpflichtige dürfte beim alljährlichen AusfUllen 
der  Einkommensteuererklärung  schon  mehr  als  einmal  über  die  nahezu  unüberblickbaren 
Vorschriften geflucht haben. 
Dabei  ist  es  nicht  in  erster Linie nie Komplexität  des Steuerrechts an sich,  welche 
Unternehmen wie Arbeitnehmern die Zornesröte  ins  Gesicht  treibt.  Vielmehr  ist es  die  als 
extrem  empfundene  Schnelllebigkeit der  Steuergesetzgebung:  Kaum  hat  man  sich  in  eine 
neue Regelung eingearbeitet, wird sie auch schon wieder von einer anderen abgelöst. Andel 
sprach 1998 in diesem Zusammenhang vom "chaotischen Aktionismus des Gesetzgebers", der 
das Aktualisieren eines finanzwissenschaftlichen Lehrbuchs extrem erschwere (AndeI,  1998, 
S.  111).62  Auch  der  Bankenverband  bemerkt,  dass  "die  verabschiedeten  Gesetze  in  immer 
kürzeren Abständen geändert, oft schon nach ihrem Inkrafttreten, [ .. ] nachgebessert" werden 
(Bundesverband deutscher Banken, 2005)  Die Forderungen nach "Ruhe an der Steuerfront" 
(BITKOM, 2003) und einer höheren "Planungssicherheit im Steuerrecht" (Verband der freien 
Berufe  in  Bayern,  2005)  findet  sich  daher  immer  wieder.  Sogar  die 
Bundessteuerberaterkammer  also  ein  vermeintlicher  Profiteur  der  steuerrechtlichen 
Komplexität  - fordert  in  einer  Pressemitteilung  aus  dem  September  2005  "nur  ein 
'"  Diese Kapitel beruht auf einer gemeinsamen ArbeIt:  Blasch, Frank; Klautke, Tina; Weichenrieder, Alfons J. 
(2007).  ,,Das  steuerpolitische  Dezemberfieber:  Steuergesetzgebung  in  Deutschland  von  1951  bis  2004", 
Perspektiven der W!rIschajispolillk, 8(3), 221-241. 
., So argumentiert beispielsweise die Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbcilgeberverbände (2003, S, 30)  . 
• 2 Beispielhaft sei hier auf  den Überblick über die Änderungen im Untemehmenssteuerrecht bei Büttgen-Pöhland 
(2004, S. 38ff) verwiesen, 
61 Steuergesetz pro Jahr, verabschiedet zur Mitte eines Jahres,  Inkrafttreten mit  Wirkung zum 
1. Januar des Folgejahres" (Bundessteuerberaterkammer, 2005, S. 3). 
Auch die  Politik hat die Klagen der Wirtschaft vernommen und fordert ähnliches. So 
sprach  Thüringens  Ministerpräsident  Dieter  Althaus  in  einer  Rede  anlässlieh  des 
12. Symposiums  "Deutsche  Fragen"  des  Bundesverbandes  deutscher  Banken  mit  dem 
Ostdeutschen Bankenverband und der  Universität Erfurt am  27. Oktober 2004:  "Die stetige 
Flut  von  Gesetzesänderungen  haben  einen  ,Steuerdschungel'  geschaffen,  der  international 
seinesgleichen  sucht.  [  ... ]  Für  die  Steuerpflichtigen  ist  das  Steuerrecht  damit  nicht  mehr 
verständlich."  Der  niedersächsische  Finanzminister  Hartmut  Möllring  erkennt  in  einem 
Grußwort  anlässlich  der  Landesverbandstagung  des  Steuerberaterverbandes  Niedersachsen 
und  Sachsen-Anhalt  im  Mai  2003,  dass  "das  ständige  ,Hin  und  Her'  in  der 
Steuergesetzgebung  [  ... ]  die  Planungssicherheit"  nicht  fördert.  Er  fordert  daher  "mehr 
Verlässlichkeit  auch  und  gerade  in  der  Steuergesetzgebung".  Und  schließlich  schreibt  das 
Ministerium  fur  Wirtschaft  des  Landes  Brandenburg  in  einer  Pressemitteilung  aus  dem 
September 2004: "Das Steuerrecht muss außerdem berechenbarer werden. Es kann nicht sein, 
dass Paragrafen immer wieder geändert werden. Unternehmen brauchen Planungssicherheit. " 
(Ministerium für Wirtschaft des Landes Brandenburg, 2004). 
Während Klagen und  Forderungen hauptsächlich auf subjektiven Empfindungen der 
Betroffenen  beruhen,  existieren  kaum  systematische  empirische  Untersuchungen  über  die 
deutsche Steuergesetzgebung63 Als  wichtige Vorarbeit  ist  das Papier von Köster (2005) zu 
nennen,  der  die  Steuerreformen  in  der  Bundesrepublik der  Jahre  1964  bis  2004  empirisch 
untersucht  hat.  Dabei  unterscheidet  er zwischen  Reformen,  die  die  Steuerlast  der  Bürger 
erhöht haben und solchen, die zu einer finanziellen Entlastung geführt haben. Zur Ermittlung 
dieser Angaben nutzt er den Finanzbericht des  Bundesministeriums der Finanzen (BMF), in 
dem  die  wichtigsten  Steuerrechtsänderungen  aufgeführt  und  deren  vermutete  tinanzielle 
Auswirkungen prognostiziert werden. Die zentralen Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit sind zum einen, 
dass "bürgerliche" Bundesregierungen (unter CDU-Führung) weniger Steuerreformaktivitäten 
zeigen  als  SPD-geführte  Kabinette.  Zum  zweiten  werden  in  den  Monaten  vor  einer 
63  Berger  (1998)  verfolgt  einen  ähnlichen  quantitativen  Ansatz  und  ennillelt  den  Zeitpfad  der 
Regulierungsaktivität auf dem  Arbeits-, dem Kapitalmarkt und  auf dem Gebiet der Umweltpolitik. Dabei wird 
deutlich,  dass  ein  negativer  Zusammenhang  zwischen  Regulierungsaktivität  und  dem  Wirtschaftswachstum 
besteht. Bräuninger und König (2000) analysieren die innere Mechanik der deutschen Gesetzgebung und gehen 
insbesondere  der  Frage  nach,  welche  Detenninanten  die  WallfScheinlichkeit  der  Verabschiedung  einer 
Gesetzesinitiative  und  die  Dauer  des  Gesetzgebungsprozesses  beeinflussen.  Eine  Studie  der 
Steuerberatungsgesellschaft  PricewaterhouseCoopers  aus  dem  Jahr  2006  vergleicht  den  Umfang  des 
Unternehmenssteuerrechts der zwanzig größten Volkswirtschaften der Welt auf zentralstaatlicher Ebene anhand 
der existierenden Gesetzestextseiten. In dieser einfachen Analyse belegt Deutschland den zehnten Platz mit 1700 
Seiten (Cussons, 2006, S.  16). 
62 Bundestagswahl weniger Steuererhöhungen vorgenommen als sonst, und schließlich werden 
. weniger  Steuererhöhungen  verabschiedet,  wenn  in  Bundestag  und  Bundesrat  die  gleichen 
Parteien die Mehrheiten haben. 
Der  vorliegende  Aufsatz  ergänzt  die  Ergebnisse  Kösters,  indem  die  herrschenden 
Vennutungen  über  die  Entwicklung  der  Steuergesetzgebung  anband  der  Anzahl  und  des 
Umfangs  der  vom  Bund  und  von  den  Ländern  erlassenen  Gesetze  einerseits  und  den 
Rechtsverordnungen andererseits  in  den Jahren von  1951  bis  2004 untersucht werden.  Als 
breitere  Datenbasis  nutzen  wir  das  vom  BMF  herausgegebene  Bundessteuerblatt,  das 
einerseits einen längeren Zeitraum abbildet und zum anderen neben den  Gesetzen auch die 
Rechtsverordnungen erfasst. Darüber hinaus erhalten wir über die Textlänge eine zusätzliche 
Information. Der Frage nach der Komplexität des Steuerrechts können wir dabei jedoch nicht 
ohne weiteres nachgehen.  Aus den im  Zeitverlauf verabschiedeten Änderungsgesetzen lässt 
sich per se nicht ablesen, ob diese das  Steuerrecht vereinfachen oder komplizierter machen. 
Zwar ist zu vermuten, dass  der Umfang eines erlassenen Gesetzes mit der Komplexität des 
gesamten Steuerrechts positiv korreliert ist, da das Streichen einer Regelung weniger Platz in 
Anspruch nimmt als  die  Änderung eines  bestehenden oder das  Hinzufügen eines gänzlich 
neuen Paragraphen. Dass die Gesetze über die Jahre komplizierter werden, lässt sich jedoch 
nicht nachweisen, ohne die Inhalte der Gesetzestexte zu analysieren und ein quantitatives Maß 
für die  Komplexität des Rechts zu entwickeln. Doch auch ohne diese kaum zu generierende 
Information können wir zumindest die Arbeitsintensität des Gesetzgebers untersuchen. Diese 
wird  dabei  einmal  gemessen  an  der  absoluten  Zahl  der  verabschiedeten  Gesetze  und 
Verordnungen und darüber hinaus am textlichen Umfang der selbigen. 
Ein erstes,  etwas überraschendes Ergebnis ist,  dass  der Output des  Gesetzgebers im 
Zeitverlauf  nicht  angestiegen  ist.  Die  Anzahl  und  der  Umfang  der  verabschiedeten 
Verordnungen sind in der Tendenz sogar leicht rückläufig.  Dass die Klagen der Steuerzahler 
aber nicht ganz unberechtigt sind,  zeigt ein zweites zentrales Resultat der Untersuchungen: 
Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Gesetze wird zum Ende eines Jahres erlassen; und der Anteil 
der  Gesetze,  die  erst  im  Dezember  verabschiedet  werden,  nimmt  im  Zeitverlauf zu.  Aus 
diesem  Grunde  kann  man  von  einem  steuerpolitischen  "Dezemberfieber"  sprechen: 
Zunehmend  werden  Gesetze,  die  für  das  nächste  Jahr  relevant  sind,  erst  im  Dezember 
endgültig  verabschiedet. 64  Der  Steuerzahler  erhält  immer  weniger  Zeit  sich  auf  die 
64  In seiner eigentlichen Bedeutung bezeichnet das Dezemberfieber die Neigung der staatlichen Bürokratie, kurz 
vor  Ende  eines  Haushaltsjahres  überproportional  hohe  Sachausgaben  zu  tätigen.  Begründet  wird  dieses 
Phänomen mit dem  üblichen  Ablauf eines Haushaltszyklus:  Dabei ist  Grundlage für den  Budgetansatz für das 
kommende  Jahr die  Höhe  des  verbrauchten  Budgets  des  Vorjahres.  Um  zukünftige  Kürzungen  des  eigenen 
63 Änderungen einzustellen. Ein drittes Ergebnis der Studie ist, dass in den zwölf Monaten vor 
einer  Bundestagswahl  signifikant  mehr  Gesetze  verabschiedet  werden  als  in  den  zwölf 
Monaten  danach.  Schließlich  zeigen  unsere  Untersuchungen,  dass  der  weit  überwiegende 
Anteil  der Steuergesetze und -verordnungen der Zustimmung des  Bundesrats bedarf.  Einen 
Einfluss  von  gespaltenen Mehrheiten zwischen Bundestag  und  der Länderkammer auf den 
zustimmungspflichtigen Anteil der Gesetze und Verordnungen finden wir hingegen nicht. 
Der weitere Text ist wie folgt strukturiert: Im nächsten Abschnitt gehen wir kurz auf 
den von uns erhobenen Datensatz ein.  Im Kapitel 4.3  untersuchen wir empirische Muster in 
der Steuergesetzgebung. Kapitel 4.4 fasst die wesentlichen Resultate zusammen. 
4.2 Der Datensatz 
Als  Datenquelle  verwenden  wir  das  Bundessteuerblatt  (Teil  I),  welches  seit  1951  vom 
Bundesministerium  der  Finanzen  (BMF)  herausgegeben  wird.  Es  enthält  alles,  "was  von 
amtlicher  Seite  auf dem  Gebiet  des  Besitz- und  Verkehrssteuerrechts65  [ ...  ]  veröffentlicht 
wird." (Bundesministerium der Finanzen,  1951,  S.  I).  Dazu gehören insbesondere alle vom 
Gesetzgeber  im  Bund  und  in  den  Ländern  verabschiedeten  Steuergesetze.  Des  Weiteren 
werden  auch  die  vom  BMF  oder  den  Ländern  erlassenen  Rechtsverordnungen  betrachtet. 
Zwar  werden  diese  von  einem  Ministerium  ohne  formelles  Verfahren  im  Bundestag 
beschlossen; trotzdem bedürfen sie, sofern sie mit Steuerfragen zusammenhängen, zu einem 
Großteil der Zustimmung des Bundesrates. 66 
Mit Hilfe dieser Quelle ist es  uns  möglich, die jährlich verabschiedeten Gesetze und 
erlassenen Verordnungen für  die Jahre von  1951  bis 2004 zu quantifizieren. Zu beachten ist 
dabei,  dass  entscheidend  fur  die  zeitliche  Zuordnung  eines  Gesetzes  nicht  deren 
Veröffentlichung im Bundessteuerblatt ist, sondern der Zeitpunkt der Ausfertigung durch den 
Bundespräsidenten.  Verzögerungen  im  Prozess  der  Veröffentlichung  verzerren  somit  die 
Budgets zu  vermeiden,  neigen  die  Bürokraten  zu  extrem  hohen,  vennutlich ineffizienten  Ausgaben kurz vor 
Jahresende. Eine ausführliche Diskussion zum Dezemberfieber findet sich z.B. bei Pappenheim (1997). 
65  Zu  den  Besitz- und  Verkehrssteuern  gehören  die  direkten  Steuern  (insbesondere  die  Einkommen-, 
Körperschaft- und Gewerbesteuer) sowie die Steuern, die Vorgänge des Rechts und Wirtschaftsverkehrs erfassen 
(insbesondere die  Erbschaft-, Gnllld-, Umsatz-, Versichernngs- und  GOlllderwerbsteuer).  Nicht erfasst werden 
im Bundessteuerblatt hingegen die speziellen Verbrauchsteuern (Kaffeesteuer, Sektsteuer, Mineralölsteuer etc.). 
Trotz dieser Einschränkung werden wir aus Gründen der Einfachheit im  Folgenden von "Steuergesetzen" oder 
dem "Steuerrecht" sprechen. 
66  Teil II  des Bundessteuerblattes beinhaltet die  Entscheidungen des Bundesfinanzhofes.  Bis  1967  gab es drei 
Teile:  Teil  I enthielt ausschließlich  die  Veröffentlichungen des BMF, Teil  II  die der Länder und  Teil  III  die 
Entscheidungen  des  Bundesfinanzhofes.  Für  diesen  Zeitraum  verwendeten  wir  die  Teile  I  und  II  bei  der 
Zusammenstellung unseres Datensatzes.  Des  Weiteren enthalten die Bundessteuerblätter nicht Recht setzende 
Bekanntmachungen und Erlasse, die wir in unserem Datensatz nicht berücksichtigen. 
64 zeitliche Einordnung nicht.  Das gleiche gilt für  die  Verordnungen, die  ebenfalls nicht nach 
ihrer Veröffentlichung, sondern nach dem Zeitpunkt des Erlasses sortiert werden. 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblatt, eigene Berechnungen. 
Zu jedem Gesetz bzw. zu jeder Verordnung haben wir darüber hinaus erhoben, ob eine 
Zustimmungspt1icht des Bundesrats bestand und wie viele Seiten der Text eingenommen hat. 
Da sich  die  Schriftgröße  der  Bundessteuerblätter  im  Laufe  der  Jahre  nicht  unwesentlich 
verändert  hat,  mussten  wir  eine  Korrektur  vornehmen.  Dies  geschah,  indem  wir  alle 
Seitenzahlen auf das Schriftbild des Jahres 1980 normierten. 
Mit Hilfe dieses Datensatzes können wir in einem ersten Schritt ermitteln, ob sich die 
Aktivität  des  Gesetzgebers  im  Laufe  der  Jahre  systematisch  verändert  hat.  Zunächst 
betrachten  wir  dabei  die  Gesetze:  Abbildung 4.1  zeigt  die  Anzahl  der jährlich erlassenen 
Gesetze  im  Zeitverlauf  (durchgezogene  Linie,  linke  Achse)  und  deren  Gesamtumfang 
gemessen in (standardisierten) Seitenzahlen (gestrichelte Linie, rechte Achse). 
Deutlich wird, dass die gesetzgeberische Aktivität starken Schwankungen unterworfen 
ist. Dabei ist ein weit gehender Gleichlaufbeider Linien erkennbar, was darauf hindeutet, dass 
die  durchschnittliche  Länge  der  Gesetze  im  Zeitverlauf in  etwa  konstant  geblieben  ist. 
Entgegen der weit verbreiteten Meinung ist  im Zeitverlauf hingegen kein AufWärtstrend zu 
65 erkennen,  was  auch  durch  Abbildung 4.2  bestätigt  wird.  Um  die  starken  jährlichen 
.Schwankungen  zu  neutralisieren,  wurden  hierzu  jeweils  sechs  Jahre  zu  einer  Gruppe 
zusammengefasst. 67 
Bis Mitte  der  1970er Jahre  ist  die  steuergesetzgeberische Tätigkeit verhältnismäßig 
konstant, ehe sie bis Ende der 1  980er Jahre deutlich zurückgeht. In den  I 990er Jahren ist dann 
wieder ein Anstieg zu erkennen,  allerdings lediglich bei den  Seitenzahlen. Der bis dahin zu 
erkennende Gleichlauf von Anzahl und Umfang wird durchbrochen: Die Gesetze scheinen im 
Schnitt länger geworden zu sein.  Allerdings ist dies in erster Linie auf einen "Ausreißer" im 
Jahr  1995  zurückzuführen:  Das  in  diesem  Jahr  verabschiedete  "Jahressteuergesetz  1996" 
fasste  Änderungen  an  nicht  weniger  als  40  einzelnen  Steuergesetzen  in  einem  einzigen 
Artikelgesetz zusammen und war insgesamt 163,5 Seiten lang. 
Abbildung  4.2:  Anzahl  und  Umfang  aller  erlassenen  Gesetze  im  Zeitverlauf (6-Jahres-
Gruppen) 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblatt, eigene Berechnungen. 
Deutlicher  und  dauerhafter  ist  der  Abwärtstrend,  wenn  man  die  Entwicklung  der 
jährlich erlassenen Rechtsverordnungen im Zeitverlauf betrachtet, wie dies in Abbildung 4.3 
67  Die  Einteilung in  6-Jahres-Gruppen erfolgt, da wir so neun gleich große Gruppen erhalten und die Zahlen 
damit unmittelbar vergleichbar sind. 
66 vorgenommen wird.  Auch hier sind jeweils sechs Jahre  zu einer Gruppe zusanunengefasst. 
. Seit den  1950er Jahren zeigt sich fast ein linearer Abwärtstrend, der lediglich in den  1970er 
und Mitte der I 990er Jahre leicht nach oben durchbrochen wird. 
Abbildung 4.3: Anzahl und Umfang aller erlassenen Rechtsverordnungen im Zeitverlauj (6-
Jahres-Gruppen) 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblatt, eigene Berechnungen. 
Eine  mögliche  Verzerrung  bei  den  bisherigen  Darstellungen  könnte  in  der 
Wiedervereinigung  und  der  damit  verbundenen  Zunahme  von  II auf  16  Bundesländer 
begründet liegen. Die Zahlen ab  1991  sind daher nicht mehr ohne weiteres mit den vorherigen 
vergleichbar,  da  sie  ja auch  die  von  den  Bundesländern  verabschiedeten  Gesetze  bzw. 
erlassenen  Rechtsverordnungen  enthalten.  Daher  ergänzen  wir  unsere  Analyse  um  zwei 
weitere  Grafiken,  die  ausschließlich  die  Bundesgesetze  (Abbildung 4.4)  und 
Bundesverordnungen (Abbildung 4.5) zeigen, da bei der reinen Betrachtung der Bundesebene 
der  Strukturbruch  herausgefiItert  wird.  Wir  beschränken  uns  dabei  auf  die 
Gruppendarstellung. 
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Bei den Bundesgesetzen ändert sich das Bild kaum gegenüber der Abbildung 4.2.  Es 
ist  kein' allgemein steigender Trend zu erkennen,  aber  auch  die  schwache  Abwärtstendenz 
verschwindet fast  vollkommen.  Hinsichtlich der Verordnungen  verstärkt sich hingegen der 
stark fallende Trend noch einmal - der Bund erlässt immer weniger Rechtsverordnungen. Ob 
die  beobachteten  Schwankungen und  Tendenzen einer bestimmten  Systematik unterliegen, 
wird im folgenden Kapitel 4.3 genauer untersucht. 
68 Abbildung 4.5: Anzahl und Umfang aller erlassenen Bundesverordnungen im Zeitverlauf (6-
. Jahres-Gruppen) 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblatt, eigene Berechnungen. 
4.3 Empirische Muster in der Steuergesetzgebung 
4.3.1 Abhängigkeit der Steuergesetzgebung vom Wahlzyklus 
In einem ersten Schritt untersuchen wir,  ob die  steuerliche Gesetzgebungsaktivität von  den 
Wahlzyklen  abhängt.  Da  die  wesentlichen  steuerlichen  Regelungen  auf  Bundesebene 
getroffen werden, konzentrieren wir uns im Folgenden auf die Gesetze und Verordnungen, die 
vom Bund erlassen wurden. 
In seinem Pionierwerk "The Economic Theory of Democracy" aus dem Jahr 1957 hat 
Anthony  Downs  umfassend  das  Verhalten  von  Wählern  und  Politikern  analysiert.  Dabei 
kommt er u.a.  zu dem Schluss, dass für die Wahlentscheidung der Bürger das, was eine Partei 
in  der  zu Ende  gehenden  Wahlperiode  getan  hat,  deutlich  wichtiger  ist  als  das,  was  die 
Parteien für die Zukunft versprechen (Retrosepctive Voting). Ähnlich argumentieren Persson 
und  Tabellini  (2003,  S.  18f1)  sowie  Nordhaus  (1975,  S.  181).  Da  die  Erinnerungen  an 
politische Entscheidungen, die kurz vor einem Wahltermin getroffen werden, frischer sind als 
an  Entscheidungen,  die  unmittelbar  zu  Beginn  einer  Legislaturperiode  getroffen  werden, 
spricht die Down' sche Theorie dafür, dass die Gesetzgebungsaktivität der Regierung kurz vor 
69 einem Wahltennin größer ist als  direkt nach einer Wahl  (Downs,  1968,  S. 35tI). Dies gilt 
insbesondere  dann,  wenn  die  anstehenden  Entscheidungen  populär  sind  und  darauf hoffen 
lassen, dass man auf diese Weise noch den einen oder anderen Wähler für sich gewinnen kann 
(Köster, 2005, S.  15).  Einen weiteren Grund für eine reduzierte Gesetzgebungstätigkeit nach 
einer  Wahl  gibt  es,  wenn  es  nach  dem  Umengang  zu  einer  Veränderung  im  Amt  des 
Bundesfinanzministers  kommt.  Meistens  werden  bei  dieser  Gelegenheit  Abteilungen  neu 
geordnet  und  auch  auf unterer  Ebene  Positionen  neu  besetzt.  Eine  neue  Leitung  benötigt 
vermutlich eine gewisse Einarbeitungszeit und ist daher in den ersten zwölf Monaten nicht so 
produktiv wie die Vorgängerleitung in ihren letzten zwölf Monaten. 
Andererseits gibt es  aber auch  gute  Gründe  dafür,  dass  gerade vor  Wahlen weniger 
Gesetze  erlassen  werden.  Die  Empfehlung  Machiavellis,  "Grausamkeiten"  direkt  nach 
Amtsantritt zu beschließen, würde  dafür  sprechen,  dass  die  Gesetzgebung insbesondere  zu 
Beginn einer Legislaturperiode zunimmt. Schließlich ist nicht selten zu beobachten, dass ein 
knappes  Jahr  vor  dem  Wahltennin  der  Beginn  des  Wahlkampfes  ausgerufen  wird  und 
gesetzgeberische Vorhaben in dieser Phase gerade nicht mehr in Angritf genommen werden. 
Während  die  Theorie  uns  also  keine  eindeutige Antwort auf die  Frage gibt,  ob  der 
Gesetzgeber vor oder nach einer Wahl  aktiver ist, sprechen die Daten eine relativ eindeutige 
Sprache.  Im ersten Schritt betrachten wir zunächst wieder die  Geset::e:  Abbildung 4.6 zeigt, 
wie viele Gesetze der Bund in  den zwölf Monaten vor einer Bundestagswahl verabschiedet 
hat (schwarze Säulen) und wie viele danach (schraffierte Säulen). 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblau, eigene Berechnungen. 
Wie man sehr gut erkennen kann, wurden in den zwölf Monaten vor einer Wahl  fast 
immer deutlich mehr Gesetze erlassen als in den zwölf Monaten nach einer Wahl. 68 Dabei gab 
es  nur vier MaI  durch eine  Wahl  auch einen Wechsel  im  Amt des Bundesfinanzministers: 
1957 (Etzel folgte Schäffer), 1961  (Starke folgte Etzel), 1969 (Möller folgte Strauß) und 1998 
(Lafontaine  folgte  Waigel).  In  den  anderen  Wahljahren  herrschte  also  Kontinuität  an  der 
Spitze des Ministeriums und dennoch wurden meist deutlich weniger Gesetze verabschiedet 
als  vor  der  Wahl.  Lediglich  in  den Jahren  1972  und  1990  ist  die  Differenz nicht so  stark 
ausgeprägt,  und  im  Jahr  1983  wird  die  Regel  sogar  einmal  durchbrochen.  Diese  drei 
Wahljahre sind allerdings gerade diejenigen,  in  denen die Legislaturperiode auf  grund einer 
vorzeitigen  Auflösung  des  Bundestages  (1972  und  1983)  bzw.  auf  grund  der 
Wiedervereinigung  (1990)  verkürzt  wurde,  wodurch  der  normale  Rhythmus  der 
Gesetzgebung gestört worden sein dürfte69 
Bei  den  Verordnungen  ist hingegen kein  klares,  von  den  Wahlterminen  abhängiges 
Muster zu erkennen, wie Abbildung 4.7 zeigt. Auch hier stehen die schwarzen Balken tur die 
68 Der Wilcoxon-Rangsummentest bestätigt diese Beobachtung auf einem Signifikanzniveau von unter 0,1  %. 
69  Ein  nahezu  identisches  Bild ergibt  sich, wenn man  statt der  Anzahl  den  Umfang  der  vor und nach  einer 
Bundestagswahl verabschiedeten Gesetze betrachtet. 
71 in den zwölf Monaten vor einer Bundestagswahl erlassenen Verordnungen, die schraffierten 
. hingegen  f1ir  die  im  Jahr  nach  der  Wahl  beschlossenen.  Offensichtlich  lässt  sich  der 
Gesetzgeber  bei den  weniger öffentlichkeitswirksamen  Rechtsverordnungen  nicht  so  stark 
von  den  Wahlterminen  beeinflussen  wie  bei  den  Gesetzen,  was  als  Hinweis  für  eine 
Bestätigung der Theorien von Downs sowie Persson und Tabellini gedeutet werden kann. 
Abbildung  4.7:  Anzahl  der  Bundesverordnungen  im  Jahr  vor  und  im  Jahr  nach  einer 
Bundestagswahl 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblatt, eigene Berechnungen. 
4.3.2 Zustimmungspflicht des Bundesrates 
Nicht alle Gesetze und Verordnungen können der Bundestag bzw.  die Bundesregierung von 
sich aus beschließen. Sobald diese Auswirkungen auf die Bundesländer haben - und dies ist 
auf  grund  der  hohen  Verflechtung  bei  den  Steuereinnahmen  zwischen  den 
Gebietskörperschaften sehr häutig der Fall- muss auch der Bundesrat zustimmen. In diesem 
Kapitel beschäftigen wir uns daher mit der Frage, ob  die gesetzgeberische Aktivität mit den 
Mehrheitsverhältnissen in Bundestag und Bundesrat zusammenhängt. 
Abbildung 4.8 zeigt dabei zunächst, welcher Anteil der verabschiedeten Gesetze  der 
Zustimmung des  Bundesrats bedurfte.  Man kann sehr gut erkennen, dass der überwiegende 
72 Anteil der die Steuern betreffenden Gesetze zustimmungspflichtig ist.  Die Quote liegt fast  in 
. jedem Jahr über 50 Prozent,  in  sieben Jahren konnte sogar kein einziges  Gesetz ohne  den 
Segen der Länderkammer verabschiedet werden. 
Abbildung 4.8: Anteil der zustimmungspjlichtigen Bundesgesetze 
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Um die  starken jährlichen Schwankungen wieder zu neutralisieren,  haben wir auch 
hier  die  Zahlen  zu jeweils  Sechs-Jahres-Gruppen  zusammengefasst70  Wie  Abbildung 4.9 
zeigt, ist allenfalls eine leichte Aufwärtstendenz im Zeitverlauf zu erkennen. Dies überrascht 
nicht,  da der Anteil der zustimmungspflichtigen Gesetze bereits in den  1950er Jahren sehr 
hoch  lag  (über  80  Prozent).  Insofern  ist  ein  weiterer  deutlicher  Anstieg  kaum  möglich. 
Andererseits gab es seither auch keine bedeutende Änderung der Finanzverfassung mit der 
Folge einer Entflechtung und stärkerer Einnahmeautonomie für  den Bund auf der einen und 
die  Länder auf der  anderen Seite,  die  ein Sinken des  zustimmungspflichtigen Anteils hätte 
erwarten  lassen.  Auch  die  kürzlich  von  beiden  Kammern  angenommene  Reform  des 
Föderalismus  dürfte  hier  keine  Änderung  bringen,  da  die  Finanzverfassung  von  den 
70 Die Zusammenfassung von jeweils sechs Jahren zu einer Gruppe ist aus Gründen der Einheitlichkeit gewählt 
und nicht inhaltlich motiviert. Andere Gruppienmgen führen zu sehr ähnlichen Trendverläufen. 
73 Änderungen weitgehend ausgenommen und in ein zweites Refonnvorhaben auf unbestimmte 
Zeit verschoben wurde. 71 
Abbildung 4.9: Anteil der zustimmungspj1ichtigen Bundesgesetze (6-Jahres-Gruppen) 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblatt, Eigene Berechnungen 
Ein  nahezu  identisches  Bild  ergibt  sich  bei  Betrachtung  der  Rechtsverordnungen. 
Abbildung 4.10  zeigt  den  zustimmungspflichtigen  Anteil  der  Bundesverordnungen  im 
Zeitverlauf, wobei wiederum sechs Jahre zu einer Gruppe zusammengefasst wurden. In jeder 
Jahresgruppe unterlagen mindestens 60 % der Verordnungen einer Zustimmungspflicht, Mitte 
der 1990er Jahre erreichte diese Quote sogar Werte von mehr als 90 %.  Über den gesamten 
Zeitverlauf ist auch bei den Rechtsverordnungen ein leicht steigender Trend zu erkennen. 
71  Auch  die  inzwischen  beschlossene  Einsetzung  einer  Reformkommission  zur  Vorbereitung  der 
,,Föderalismusrefonn  11"  lässt  aufgrund  der  abzusehenden  Schwierigkeiten  in  den  Verhandlungen  zwischen 
Bund und Ländern keine zeitnahe Änderung erwarten. 
74  • 
• Abbildung 4.10: Anteil der zustimmungspjlichtigen Verordnungen (6-Jahres-Gruppen) 
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Hinsichtlich der Systematik könnte man annehmen, dass der Anteil an Gesetzen oder 
Verordnungen,  die  der  Zustimmung  des  Bundesrates  bedürfen,  mit  den 
Mehrheitsverhältnissen in Bundestag und Bundesrat korreliert ist.  Hinter dieser Hypothese 
steht die Überlegung, dass der zustimmungspflichtige Anteil in den Jahren besonders hoch ist, 
in denen die Parteien, die die Bundesregierung stellen, auch die Mehrheit der Stimmen im 
Bundesrat haben. Umgekehrt wird eine Bundesregierung fiir den Fall, dass sie keine Mehrheit 
in der Länderkammer hat, bemüht sein, Gesetze so zu verfassen, dass eine Zustimmung des 
Bundesrates nicht erforderlich  ist.  Zwar ist auf  grund der  starken Interdependenzen in der 
Finanzverfassung  der  überwiegende  Teil  der  Steuergesetze,  wie  bereits  erwiilmt, 
zustimmungspflichtig und der Freiheitsgrad der Bundesregierung daher sehr eingeschränkt. 
Dass dennoch mitunter versucht wird, Gesetze zustimmungsfrei zu gestalten, zeigte sich z.B. 
im Rahmen der Rentemeform 200 I. Die SPD/Grüne-Regierung splittete das Reformvorhaben 
in einen zustimmungsfreien Teil (Altersvermögensergänzungsgesetz), der umnittelbar in Kraft 
treten konnte, und einen zustimmungspflichtigen Teil (Altersvermögensgesetz), der erst nach 
einem  Vermittlungsverfahren  von  beiden  Kanunern  verabschiedet  wurde  (Heller,  2001, 
S.  232f.). Die Zustimmungsbedürftigkeit von Gesetzen könnte also endogen sein und von den 
Mehrheitsverhältnissen im Bundesrat abhängen. 
75 
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\ Abbildung  4.11:  Anteil  der  zustimmungspjlichtigen  Bundesgesetze  und  Verordnungen  in 
.Abhängigkeit von den Mehrheiten in Bundestag und Bundesrat 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblatt, eigene Berechnungen. 
Anmerkung: Dunkelgrau schattierte Flächen kennzeichnen  eine  Regierungsmehrheit im  Bundesrat, hellgraue 
Schattierungen eine Oppositionsmehrheit. 
Abbildung 4.11  gteift diesen Gedanken auf und verdeutlicht die Mehrheitsverhältnisse 
in  Bundestag  und  Bundesrat  durch  Schattierungen.  Dabei  bedeutet  ein  dunkelgrauer 
Hintergrund,  dass  die  Bundesregierung  sich auch  auf eine  Mehrheit  in der  Länderkammer 
stützen konnte.  Dies war in  16  Jahren der Fall:  Erstmals  in  den  Jahren von  1962 bis  1969 
unter der CDU/FDP-Koalition von Bundeskanzler Erhard sowie  der anschließenden großen 
Koalition unter Kiesinger und ein weiteres Mal unter der Regierung Kohl in den Jahren 1983 
bis  1990.  Dem  gegenüber  kemlZeichnen  hellgrau  unterlegte  Perioden,  dass  die 
Bundestagsopposition  eine  Mehrheit  im  Bundesrat  hatte  und  sie  diese  gezielt  als 
Blockadeinstrument nutzen konnte.  Dies  war  in  14  Jahren zu beobachten:  Erstmals  in  den 
Jahren 1973 bis 1976 sowie 1978 bis 1982 unter der sozialliberalen Koalition, ein zweites Mal 
gegen Ende der Regierung Kohl  1998 und schließlich in den Jahren ab 2001  unter Rot-Grün. 
Alle  nicht  markierten Flächen  signalisieren,  dass  weder  die  Bundestagsmehrheit  noch  die 
dortige Opposition über eine Mehrheit im Bundesrat verfugten. 
Die Vermutung, dass der Anteil der zustimmungspflichtigen Gesetze von der Mehrheit 
im Bundesrat abhängt, wird nicht bestätigt. Allenfalls in der zweiten "dunkel grauen" Phase in 
76 den  1980er Jahren scheint der Anteil der zustimmungspflichtigen Gesetze und Verordnungen 
. etwas  über dem  Durchschnitt zu liegen.  Demgegenüber weist  die  erste  Phase mit  gleichen 
Mehrheiten in beiden Kammern in den I 960er Jahren sogar eher unterdurchschnittliche Werte 
auf Dies zeigt sich auch, wenn man die durchschnittlichen zustimmungspflichtigen Anteile in 
den  drei  zu  unterscheidenden  Zuständen  (Mehrheit  in  beiden  Kammern,  Opposition  im 
Bundestag, aber Mehrheit im Bundesrat, Sonstige Konstellationen) betrachtet: In den Jahren, 
in  denen  die  Bundesregierung  auch  die  Mehrheit  im  Bundesrat  stellt,  waren  81,71 %  der 
Bundesgesetze und 76,66 % der Verordnungen zustimmungspflichtig. Dem gegenüber stehen 
86,22 % (bzw.  81,98 %) in den Jahren,  in denen die  Bundestagsopposition die  Mehrheit im 
Bundesrat stellt und 83,38 % (bzw.  86,63 %),  wenn weder Regierung noch Opposition über 
eine Stimmenmehrheit in der Länderkarnmer verfugten. 
Die  graphischen  Eindrücke  und  die  Betrachtung  der  Durchschnitte  bestätigen  sich 
auch  in  einer  einfachen  Regressionsanalyse,  deren  Ergebnisse  in  Tabelle  4.1 
zusammengefasst  sind.  Sowohl  fur  Gesetze  als  auch  fur  Verordnungen  werden  zwei 
abhängige Variablen betrachtet: ZUST_ANZAHL ist der Anteil der zustimmungspflichtigen 
Bundesgesetze bzw.  Verordnungen,  gemessen an  der Anzahl,  die  Variable ZUST_SEITEN 
misst  den  Anteil  anhand  der  Seitenzahlen.  Die  Regressoren  REGIERUNG  bzw. 
OPPOSITION sind Dummy-Variablen, die den Wert  I annehmen, wenn in dem betreffenden 
Jahr  die  Bundesregierung  bzw.  die  Opposition  im  Bundestag  über  eine  Mehrheit  im 
Bundestag verfugte. 
Wie  man auf  grund von Abbildung 4.7 bereits vermuten konnte,  ist der Zeittrend bei 
den  Gesetzen  in  beiden  Regressionen  allenfalls  schwach  signifikant  positiv:  Der 
zustimmungspflichtige  Anteil  an  Steuergesetzen  gemessen  anhand  der  Anzahl  ist  im 
Zeitverlauf leicht gestiegen.  Dieser Effekt  verschwindet jedoch, wenn man  den Anteil  der 
zustimmungspflichtigen Gesetze auf Basis der Seitenzahlen definiert.  Die  Koeffizienten der 
Dummy-Variablen REGIERUNG und OPPOSITION sind nicht signifikant.  Wie  Abbildung 
4.9  bereits  vermuten  ließ,  lässt  sich  die  Hypothese  einer  Endogenität  der 
Zustimmungspflichtigkeit nicht bestätigen. 72 
Bei  den  Verordnungen  ist  der  Zeittrend stärker  positiv  und  in  beiden Regressionen 
zumindest auf dem IO%-Niveau signifikant. Der schwach signifikante negative Einfluss einer 
Regierungsmehrheit im Bundesrat auf den Anteil der zustimmungspflichtigen Verordnungen 
72  Man beachte, dass selbst ein signifikant positiver Koeffizient OPPOSITION die genaue Art der Endogenität 
ungeklärt  ließe.  Falls  die  Bundestagsmehrheit  in  Zeiten  unterschiedlicher  Mehrheiten  in  Bundestag  und 
Bundesrat zustimmungspflichtige Gesetze erst gar nicht auf den Weg bringt oder diese im  Verfahren scheitern, 
dann  wäre  auch  dies  eine  Erklärung  für  einen  hohen  relativen  Anteil  nicht  zustimmungsptlichtiger 
Gesetzesverabschiedungen. 
77 bestätigt  die  Eindrücke  aus  dem  deskriptiven  Teil,  spricht  aber  wiederum  gegen  eine 
. Endogenität. 
Offensichtlich verhindert der in  Steuerangelegenheiten doch sehr geringe  Spielraum 
bezüglich der Zustimmungspflicht für den Gesetzgeber hier deutlichere Effekte. Eine weitere 
Erklärungsmöglichkeit ist,  dass  Bundesregierungen - insbesondere bei Steuererhöhungen -
nicht  darauf bedacht  sind,  die  alleinige  Verantwortung  fUr  eine  gesetzliche  Änderung  zu 
übernehmen  und  stattdessen  eher  eine  breite  Basis  für  steuerrechtliche  Entscheidungen 
suchen.  Daher ist der  Anreiz,  bei gespaltenen Mehrheiten die  Gesetze zustimmungsfrei zu 
gestalten (sofern dies überhaupt möglich ist), gering (Köster, 2005, S.  15). 
Tabelle  4.1.'  Determinanten  des  Anteils  der  zustimmungspj1ichtigen  Bundesgesetze  und -
verordnungen 
Variable  Gesetze  Verordnungen 
ZUST  ANZAHL  ZUST  SEITEN  ZUST  ANZAHL  ZUST  SEITEN 
ZEITTREND  0,00199*  0,00088  0,00229**  0,00230* 
(0,064)  (0,283)  (0,043)  (0,083) 
REGIERUNG  -0,06131  -0,01987  -0,10099**  -0,07792* 
(0,186)  (0,589)  (0,027)  (0,073) 
OPPOSITION  0,01497  -0,01052  -0,06891  -0,05742 
(0,635)  (0,784)  (0,227)  (0,387) 
Beobachtun/len  54  54  54  54 
R'  0,14  0,019  0,13  0,087 
Anmerkuugen: *** signifikant auf I %-Niveau, ** signifikant auf 5%-Niveau, * signifikant auf 10%-Niveau. p-
Werte in Klammem basieren auf robusten Standardfehlern. Alle Regressionen beinhalten eine Konstante, deren 
Koeffizient nicht dargestellt ist. 
4.3.3 Gesetzgebung im lahresverlauf 
Der bevorzugte Termin zum Inkrafttreten von gesetzlichen Neuregelungen ist für gewöhnlich 
der  I. Januar.  Um diesen einhalten zu können und rückwirkende Regelungen zu vermeiden, 
ist  es  in  aller  Regel  erforderlich,  ein  Gesetz  bis  zum  31.  Dezember  des  Vorjahres  zu 
beschließen und zu verkünden.  Es  ist  zu erwarten,  dass  ein  fester  Termin  den  Zwang zur 
Einigung so sehr steigert, dass man umso wahrscheinlicher zu einer Entscheidung kommt, je 
näher  der  Tennin  rückt.  Deshalb  dürfte  der  Anteil  der  zum  Jahresende  verabschiedeten 
Gesetze an allen in einem Jahr verabschiedeten Gesetzen überproportional groß sein. 
Die  folgende  Abbildung  4.12  bestätigt  diese  Erwartung  eindrucksvoll.  Sie  zeigt, 
welcher Anteil der Gesetze (schwarze Säulen) bzw. Rechtsverordnungen (schraffierte Säulen) 
in  den  zwölf Monaten  eines  Jahres  über  den  gesamten  Beobachtungszeitraum  jeweils 
verabschiedet wurde.  Während der Anteil  pro Monat zwischen fünf und zehn Prozent liegt 
78 (mit  einem  kleinem  lokalen  Maximum  vor  der  Sommerpause  im  Juli),  wurden  in  einem 
. Dezember rund 23 % der  neuen Regelungen zur Rechtskraft gebracht,  also  fast  dreimal  so 
viele wie bei einer Gleichverteilung über den Jahresverlaufhinweg. Man kann gewissermaßen 
von einem steuerpolitischen "Dezemberfieber" sprechen: Kurz vor Ende des Jahres wird der 
Gesetzgeber  besonders  aktiv  und  verabschiedet  überproportional  viele  Gesetze  und 
Verordnungenn 
Die  eingangs  erwähnten  Klagen  über  die  mangelnde  Planungssicherheit  für  die 
Steuerzahler  erfahren  vor  diesem  Hintergrund  eine  besondere  Berechtigung.  Nicht  ohne 
Grund  forderte  die  Bundessteuerberaterkammer,  dass  in  Zukunft nur noch  ein Steuergesetz 
pro  Jahr,  und  dieses  spätestens  zur  Jahresmitte  zu  verabschieden  sei,  so  dass  bis  zum 
Inkrafttreten  noch  einige  Monate  vergehen  können.  Abbildung  4.12  belegt,  dass  diese 
Forderung nicht aus der Luft gegriffen, sondern eine Folge der steuerrechtlichen Realität ist. 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblatt, eigene Berechnungen. 
Anmerkungen: Dargestellt wird der monatliche Anteil an allen Gesetzen (schwarze Säulen) bzw. Verordnungen 
(schraftierte Säulen) im Zeitraum von 1951  bis 2004. 
73  Bei der Interpretation von Abbildung 4.12 ist zu beachten, dass der parlamentarische Sitzungskalender einen 
gewissen Gesetzgebungszyklus vorgibt:  So wird die Arbeit meist erst in  der zweiten oder dritten Januarwoche 
wieder voll aufgenommen, was den relativ geringen Anteil zu Beginn des Jahres erklären dürfte. F  emer ist der 
August (und zum Teil noch der September) durch die Sommerpause ein Monat, in dem auch apriori eine geringe 
Gesetzgebungstätigkeit zu erwarten ist. 
79 Betrachtet man den Anteil der im Dezember an den im gesamten Jahr verabschiedeten 
Gesetzen (durchgezogene Linie) bzw.  Verordnungen (gestrichelte Linie) im Zeitverlauf, wie 
dies in  Abbildung 4.13  getan wird,  sieht man,  dass  dieses "Dezemberfieber" immer weiter 
steigt. Dabei wurden die Legislaturperioden zu Gruppen zusammengefasst, um die jährlichen 
Schwankungen zu  neutralisieren.  In  den  1980er Jahren war  das  Dezemberfieber besonders 
stark ausgeprägt: Gut 40 % der jährlichen Steuergesetze kam erst im letzten Monat des Jahres 
zu  Stande.  In  den  1990er Jahren sank  diese  Quote  zunächst wieder,  in  den  letzten Jahren 
unseres Beobachtungszeitraums hat sie aber wieder knapp 40 % überschritten und  ist damit 
deutlich höher als in den ersten Jahren der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Bei den  Verordnungen  ist der Anstieg des Dezemberfiebers im Zeitverlauf bis Ende 
der  1990er  Jahre  kontinuierlich  und  erreicht  schließlich  über  35%.  Erst  in  der  letzten 
Jahresgruppe sinkt der Anteil dann wieder auf  gut 15%. 
Abbildung 4.13: Anteil der im Dezember an den im gesamten Jahr verabschiedeten Gesetzen 
und Verordnungen im Zeitverlau/ 
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Quelle: BMF, Bundessteuerblatt, eigene Berechnungen. 
Unsere  Schlüsse  aus  der  graphischen  Betrachtung  werden  auch  im  Rahmen  einer 
einfachen  Regressionsanalyse  bestätigt,  deren  Ergebnisse  in  Tabelle  4.2  zusammengefasst 
80 sind.  Die  abhängige  Variable  in  der  ersten  Spalte  ist  der  Anteil  der  im  Dezember 
. verabschiedeten  an  allen  im  gleichen  Jahr erlassenen Gesetzen,  in  der  zweiten  Spalte  der 
entsprechende  Anteil  bei  den  Verordnungen.  Der  Zeittrend  ist  jeweils  positiv  und  hoch 
signifikant.  Als  weiteren Regressor haben wir die  Dummy-Variable WAHL eingeführt, die 
den  Wert  I  annimmt,  sofern  im  betreffenden  Jahr  eine  Bundestagswahl  stattfand.  Wenig 
überraschend  ist  der  Koeffizient  dieser  Variable  bei  den  Gesetzen  signifikant negativ.  Da 
Bundestagswahlen  zumeist  im  Herbst  stattgefunden  haben  und  die  Gesetzgebungsaktivität 
nach einer Wahl deutlich geringer als davor ist (siehe Kapitel 4.3.1), sinkt in Wahljahren auch 
der Dezemberanteil. 
Tabelle 4.2: Determinanten des Dezemberjiebers, alle Gesetze und Verordnungen 
Variable  Gesetze  Verordnungen 
ANT  DEZ  ANT  DEZ 
ZEITTREND  0,00542***  0,00200** 
(0,000)  (0,032) 
WAHL  -0,13041**  -0,00581 
(0,012)  (0,860) 
Beobachtungen  54  54 
R'  0,385  0,086 
Anmerkungen: *** signifikant auf I %-Niveau, **  signifikant auf 5%-Niveau, * signifikant auf JO%-Niveau. P-
Werte in Klanlmem basieren auf robusten Standardfehlern. Alle Regressionen beinhalten eine Konstante, deren 
Koeffizient nicht dargestellt ist. 
Eine nahe liegende weitere Fragestellung ist nun, ob das Dezemberfieber in den Jahren 
besonders  ausgeprägt  ist,  in  denen  eine  bestimmte  Mehrheitskonstellation  im  Bundesrat 
gegeben ist.  Aus diesem Grunde fügen wir die Variablen REGIERUNG und OPPOSITION 
als  zusätzliche  Regressoren ein,  wobei  als  abhängige  Variable  nun  der Dezemberanteil  an 
allen  zustimmungspflichtigen  Bundesgesetzen  (I. Spalte)  bzw.  Verordnungen  (2. Spalte) 
fungiert  (siehe  Tabelle  4.3).  Auch  bei  diesen  Spezifikationen  finden  wir  einen  signifikant 
positiven Zeittrend.  Die Koeffizienten der Variablen REGIERUNG  und OPPOSITION sind 
jedoch nicht  signifikant.  Der  Dezemberanteil  hängt  demnach offensichtlich  nicht  von  den 
Bundesratsmehrheiten ab. 
81 Tabelle  4.3:  Determinanten  des  Dezemberjiebers,  nur zuslimmungspjlichtige  Gesetze  und 
Verordnungen 
Gesetze  Verordnungen 
ANT  DEZ  ZUST  ANT  DEZ  ZUST 
JAHR  0,00587***  0,00445*** 
(0,000)  (0,002) 
WAHL  -0,17099*'*  -0,02756 
(0,002)  (0,564) 
REGIERUNG  0,04132  0,02972 
(0,455)  (0,574) 
OPPOSITION  -0,05240  -0,07342 
(0,253)  (0,248) 
Beobachtungen  54  54 
R'  0,381  0,167 
Anmerkungen: '*' signifikant auf 1  %-Niveau, "  signifikant auf 5%-Niveau, * signifikant auf lO%-Niveau. P-
Werte in Klammern basieren auf robusten Standardfehlern. Alle Regressionen beinhalten eine Konstante, dessen 
Koeffizient nicht dargestellt ist. 
4.4 Fazit 
Unsere Untersuchungen haben gezeigt, dass  in den letzten Jahrzehnten entgegen einer weit 
verbreiteten Meinung die "Produktivität" des Steuergesetzgebers, wenn man sie quantitativ in 
Gesetzestexten bemisst, nicht gestiegen ist.  Bei den Verordnungen gab es sogar einen leicht 
sinkenden Trend. 
Allerdings  ist  festzuhalten,  dass  den  Steuerpflichtigen,  den  Steuerberatern  und 
Finanzämtern immer weniger Zeit gegeben wird, sich auf neue Regelungen einzustellen. Der 
Anteil der im Monat Dezember erlassenen Gesetze und Verordnungen hat über die Jahrzehnte 
signifikant  zugenommen.  Wir  haben  es  mit  einem  "Dezemberfieber"  in  der 
Steuergesetzgebung zu tun:  Kurz vor Jahresende wird der Gesetzgeber besonders aktiv, um 
Reformen noch vor Beginn des neuen Jahres zu verabschieden. Nicht zuletzt diese steigende 
Tendenz zur Beschlussfassung "kurz vor Toresschluss" dürfte zum Ärger über das deutsche 
Steuerrecht  besonders  beitragen.  Zwar  ist  vorstellbar,  dass  die  Fortschritte  in  der 
Informationstechnologie  bei  den  Steuerpflichtigen  eine  beschleunigte  Adaption  an 
Steuernovellierungen  erlauben  könnten.  Andererseits  könnte  aber  gerade  der  Eingriff in 
bestehende Software hier längere Vorlaufzeiten angezeigt sein lassen. 
Unsere  Studie  zeigt  ferner,  dass  der  These  des  "Retrospective  Voting"  in 
Politikerkreisen  offensichtlich  große  Bedeutung beigemessen wird:  Die  Anzahl  der  in  den 
zwölf Monaten vor einer Bundestagswahl verabschiedeten Steuergesetze ist signifikant höher 
als  im Jahr nach  dem  Urnengang.  Vor dem Hintergrund der Ergebnisse von Köster (2005), 
82 der gezeigt hat,  dass es die  Politiker venneiden, Steuererhöhungen kurz vor einer Wahl  zu 
verabschieden,  zeigt  sich,  dass  man  den  Souverän  vor  einer  Abstimmung  mit 
Steuersenkungen anscheinend freundlich stimmen möchte. 
Der überwiegende Teil der Steuergesetze bedarf der Zustimmung des Bundesrats. Der 
Anteil der zustimmungspflichtigen Gesetze lag bereits zu Beginn der  1950er Jahre bei rund 
80 %  und  ist  seither  noch  weiter  gestiegen.  Dies  spiegelt  die  starken  Interdependenzen 
innerhalb  der  Finanzverfassung  in  der  Bundesrepublik wider.  Eine  - häufig  geforderte -
Entflechtung und damit einhergehend stärkere Autonomie von Bund und Ländern ist nicht in 
Sicht.  Jedoch  ergibt  sich  in  unserer  quantitativen  Analyse  kein  Einfluss  der  gespaltenen 
Mehrheiten  auf  das  Ausmaß  des  Dezemberfiebers.  In  dieser  Hinsicht  verspricht  eine 
Entflechtung daher nicht unbedingt Verbesserung. 
Bei all  diesen Ergebnissen müssen die  Grenzen unserer Analyse im Auge behalten 
werden.  So haben wir uns nur auf den Strom an neuen Gesetzen bezogen. Die Komplexität 
der verabschiedeten Gesetze und ihre  Wirkung auf den Bestand der geltenden Regelungen 
blieben  außen  vor.  Und  obwohl  unser  Ansatz  einer  systematischen  Quantifizierung  der 
Gesetzgebungstätigkeit  interessante  Trends  offen  gelegt  hat,  wird  die  Frage,  wo 
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